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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
GRAHAM AUSTIN, 
Defendant/Petitioner. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
DEVON KINNE, 
Defendant/Petitioner. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
FRANKLIN ERIC HALLS, 
Defendant/Petitioner. 
Case No. 20060508-SC 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This Court granted certiorari to review the Utah Court of Appeals' rulings in State v. 
Halls, 2006 UT App 142, 134 P.3d 1160, State v. Kinne, 2006 UT App 156U, and State v. 
Austin, 2006 UT App 184U (addendum A). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (West 2004). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether this Court's holding in State v. Reyes, 116 P.3d 305 (Utah 2005), 
applied to the court of appeals' consideration of Petitioners' appeals, and whether the court 
of appeals erred in reviewing Petitioners' challenges to the reasonable doubt instruction for 
plain error. 
2. Whether the instruction that the State's evidence must "eliminate all reasonable 
doubt" constituted reversible error in light of this Court's holding in Reyes. 
"On certiorari, [this Court will] review the court of appeals' decision for correctness, 
focusing on whether that court correctly reviewed the trial court's decision under the 
appropriate standard of review." State v. King, 2006 UT 3, f^ 12, 131 P.2d 202 (quoting 
Hansen v. Eyre, 2005 UT 29, t 8, 116 P.3d 290). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Resolution of this appeal does not require interpretation of any constitutional 
provision, statute, or rule. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE1 
State v. Halls 
On 7 September 2004, Halls was charged with one count of possession of a controlled 
substance, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (West 
2004); one count of unlawful possession of imitation controlled substance, a class A 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37b-4 (West 2004); and one count of 
possession of paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-
37a-5 (West 2004). R. 26-27. 
A jury convicted Halls as charged. R.123. He was sentenced to the statutory terms. 
R.125-26. He timely appealed. R.130. 
The court of appeals unanimously affirmed his conviction in a published opinion. See 
State v. Halls, 2006 UT App 142, 134 P.3d 1160 (addendum A). This Court granted 
certiorari and consolidated the case with State v. Kinne and State v. Austin. 
State v. Kinne 
On 27 January 2004, Kinne was charged with one count each of receiving or 
transferring a stolen vehicle, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §41-
la-1316 (West 2004), and possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in 
violation Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(l) (West 2004). R. 0417-14: 1-2. In another case, 
1
 All citations to the record refer to the record of the case being described. Thus, 
within a section marked "State v. Halls" "R." refers to the Halls record. 
3 
arising out of an incident a month earlier, he was charged with burglary, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (West 2004), and theft, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (West 2004). R. 0417-12:1-2. The trial 
court consolidated the two cases for purposes of trial. R. 126: 148.2 
A jury convicted Kinne as charged. R. 117-18. He was sentenced to one to fifteen 
years on the receiving charge and six months in jail on the paraphernalia charge, to run 
concurrently with the prison sentence imposed on the two charges arising from the earlier 
incident and with credit for time served. Id. Kinne timely appealed. R. 124. 
The court of appeals unanimously affirmed in an unpublished opinion. See State v. 
Kinne, 2006 UT App 156U. This Court granted certiorari and consolidated the case with 
State v. Halls and State v. Austin. 
State v. Austin 
On 27 January 2005, Austin was charged with murder, a first degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Arm. § 76-5-203 (West 2004); aggravated robbery, a first degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (West 2004); and interfering with arrest, 
a class B misdemeanor, in violation of 76-8-305 (West 2004). R. 111-12. 
A jury convicted Austin of murder and interfering and of an amended charge of theft 
of an operable motor vehicle, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
2
 To avoid unnecessary repetition, all cites in the State's brief to the pleadings files 
in Kinne will refer only to case 0412-14. 
4 
404 (West 2004). R. 175-76,222:157. He was sentenced to five years to life for murder, one 
to fifteen years for theft, and six months for interfering, to run consecutively. R. 177-181, 
222:160, 172-173. He timely appealed. R. 182-83. 
The court of appeals unanimously affirmed in an unpublished opinion. See State v. 
Austin, 2006 UT App 184U (addendum A). This Court granted certiorari and consolidated 
the case with State v. Halls and State v. Kinne. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Because the issues on appeal do not turn on the facts of these defendants' crimes, the 
State will abbreviate its recitation of the facts. 
State v. Halls 
On 1 March 2004, Halls's co-worker turned over to police some items of drug 
paraphernalia that Halls had hidden under the passenger seat of the co-worker's truck: a glass 
pipe, a bag with a white crystal substance, a black box containing a set of scales and a couple 
of small baggies, and a larger empty bag. R.141:64, 80, 85,100. The baggies and the scales 
tested positive for methamphetamine. R. 141:87. The white crystal substance was not 
methamphetamine; Halls told police it was a "cutting agent" called "MSM." R. 151:81,101. 
Halls admitted to police that the contraband was his, an admission he attempted to retract at 
trial. R. 141:81-82, 101-02, 122, 131. 
5 
State v. Kinne 
In December of 2003, Kinne decided to rob the home of the father of someone he 
disliked. R. 126: 110. He burglarized the home while his friend stayed outside as a lookout. 
R. 126: 109,112,114-15. Kinne apparently forced his way into the home with an ice ax and 
ransacked the house. R. 126: 50, 54-56, 62. He removed a CD player, a speaker, and a 
handgun. R. 126: 113, 116-17. When police found Kinne, he was also in possession of a 
stolen Jeep and drug paraphernalia, including scales, a mirror, a syringe, baggies, and a spoon 
handle. R. 126:65,71. 
State v. Austin 
On 9 May 2004, Austin was walking along a road when Walter Pratt drove by and 
asked if he needed a ride. R. 221:72; 222:88. Austin stabbed Prattt multiple times, left him 
to die in a ditch, and drove off in Pratt's camper. R. 221:76,111,222:90. Heather Mecham 
and her four young children witnessed the murder. R. 221:72-77. 
Police officers tracked down the camper. R. 221:149. It had blood all over it, from 
the driver's seat and the dashboard to the handles and the windshield. R. 221: 220, 222-23. 
The officers searched for and found Austin buried under dirt and juniper berries under a 
juniper tree. R. 221.153, 166-68. Austin had a bloody four-inch knife in his back pocket. 
R. 221:154. Austin asked if the guy he stabbed had died. When told that the victim was 
dead, Austin said: "Oh, Lord, please forgive me. I've killed a man." R. 221:173. 
6 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
L The retroactivity of state interpretations of federal constitutional law is 
governed by federal law. As a matter of federal law, this Court's decision in Reyes is 
retroactive. However, state rules of preservation and standards of review apply even to 
claims based on federal constitutional law. Under state rules of review, defendants' 
Reyes claims are not properly before this Court. 
Absent an intolerable injustice, not present here, this Court applies ordinary rules of 
preservation to claims based on a post-trial change in the law. It has at least twice refused 
to adjudicate claims based on an intervening change in the law when the litigants failed to 
object at triaL This rule must apply with greater force where litigants not only fail to 
preserve their objection, but actually invite the very error they claim on appeal. These 
defendants approved the jury instructions they challenge on appeal. Accordingly, their 
claims are not cognizable on appeal. 
The change in law here does not present an exceptional circumstance justifying 
review. At the time of their trials, defendants were on notice that the Robertson test was 
vulnerable: Victor had already declared that the Constitution required no particular form of 
reasonable doubt instruction or even any reasonable doubt instruction at all, the court of 
appeals in Reyes /had declared the Robertson standard "constitutionally flawed," and this 
Court had granted the State's petition for certiorari in Reyes, Moreover, defendants had an 
incentive to approve a i?oZ>erteo/2-compliant instruction, since the instruction's purpose and 
7 
perceived effect was to raise the state's burden of proof. They thus suffered no manifest 
injustice. If being convicted under a Robertson-compliant jury instruction constituted a 
manifest injustice, most defendants convicted in Utah in the past quarter century could 
complain that their convictions were manifestly unjust. 
If this Court concludes that exceptional circumstances require entertaining the merits 
of defendants' claims, two of the three prongs of the plain error standard apply. The second 
prong, obviousness, cannot apply because application of this prong would always bar review, 
since it can never have been obvious to the trial court that the law would change after trial. 
But the litigant must show error and, even if the error is one normally deemed structural, he 
must show harm. 
2. No Reyes error occurred here in any event. Reyes is best understood as 
overruling the Robertson test, not the Robertson instruction. Robertson did not err by 
mandating an unconstitutional instruction, but by mandating rules for reasonable doubt 
instructions beyond what the United States Supreme Court has required. Therefore, the mere 
fact that an obviation instruction was given here did not violate constitutional requirements. 
But even if an obviation instruction is viewed as opening the door to constitutional 
error, none resulted here. The prosecutors did not argue that a reasonable doubt must be 
defined before it could serve as the basis for an acquittal. In addition, the jury instructions 
read as a whole satisfactorily informed the jury of the State's burden to establish guilt beyond 
a reasonable doubt. 
8 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
ALTHOUGH REYES APPLIES RETROACTIVELY TO THESE 
APPEALS, ANY ERROR WAS INVITED BY DEFENDANTS, WHO 
APPROVED ROBER 7S6WINSTRUCTIONS AFTER THEY WERE ON 
NOTICE THAT ROBERTSON WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY DUBIOUS 
The first issue identified in the grant of certiorari is two-fold: (1) whether this Court's 
holding in State v. Reyes, 2005 UT 33, 116 P.3d 305, applied to the court of appeals5 
consideration of Petitioners' appeals; and (2) whether the court of appeals erred in reviewing 
Petitioners' challenges to the reasonable doubt instruction for plain error. 
These issues arise because of a shift in the law between trial and appeal. At the time 
of each of these three trials, reasonable doubt instructions in Utah were governed by State 
v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1997), overruled by State v. Reyes, 2004 UT App 8, ffif 
22,30, 84 P.3d 841. In Robertson, this Court applied a tripartite test extrapolated from State 
v. Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375, 1380-822 (Utah 1989) (Stewart, J., dissenting), and State v. 
Johnson, 114 P.2d 1141. 1147-49 (Utah 1989) (Stewart, J., concurring): 
First, "the instruction should specifically state that the State's proof must 
obviate all reasonable doubt." Second, the instruction should not state that a 
reasonable doubt is one which "would govern or control a person in the more 
weighty affairs of life," as such an instruction tends to trivialize the decision 
of whether to convict. Third, "it is inappropriate to instruct that a reasonable 
doubt is not merely a possibility," although it is permissible to instruct that a 
"fanciful or wholly speculative possibility ought not to defeat proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt." 
932 P.2d at 1232 (emphasis added; citations omitted). 
9 
On 15 January 2004, before any of these defendants went to trial, the Utah Court of 
Appeals issued its opinion in State v. Reyes, 2004 UT App 8, 84 P.3d 841 (Reyes I). In 
Reyes, the State urged the court of appeals to abandon the Robertson test on the ground that 
it misstated the constitutional standard for reasonable doubt instructions as declared in Victor 
v. Nebraska, 511 US. 1 (1994). Reyes I, 2004 UT App 8, \ 20. A unanimous panel of the 
court of appeals ruled that "we simply do not have the authority to overrule Robertson," but 
agreed that Robertson could not be reconciled with Victor and described the tripartite 
Robertson standard as "constitutionally flawed." Id. at ^ 21, 22. 
On 26 May 2004, this Court granted the State's petition for certiorari. State v. Reyes, 
94 P.3d 929 (Utah 2004). None of these defendants had yet gone to trial. 
The first to be tried was Kinne, on 16 September 2004. R. 126. In substantial 
compliance with Robertson, the jury was instructed that "[t]he state must eliminate all 
reasonable doubt." R. 104. Notwithstanding the court of appeals in Reyes /having branded 
the Robertson test "constitutionally flawed," Kinne's trial counsel affirmatively approved the 
instruction. R. 126: 148. 
Halls was tried on 1 October 2004. R. 141. Again, the jury was instructed that "[t]he 
state must eliminate all reasonable doubt." R. 113. And again, despite Reyes I, defense 
counsel affirmatively approved the instruction. R. 141: 151-53. 
Austin was tried on 2 and 3 February 2005. R. 221,222. As in Kinne and Halls, the 
jury was instructed that "[i]t is the burden of the State to eliminate all reasonable doubt." R. 
10 
149. Austin's trial counsel objected to this language and asked the court to use the word 
"obviate" instead of "eliminate." R. 222:128. The court declined. R. 222:128. Austin 
otherwise approved the instructions. R. 222: 128-29. 
On 7 June 2005, after these defendants were convicted, but before they filed their 
opening briefs in the court of appeals, this Court overruled the Robertson three-part test in 
State v. Reyes, 2005 UT 33, 116 P.3d 305 (addendum B). In particular, the Reyes court 
found the "'obviate all reasonable doubt' concept" "linguistically opaque and conceptually 
suspect." 2005 UT 33, f 26. It concluded that, "[t]o the extent that the Robertson 'obviate' 
test would permit the State to argue that it need only obviate doubts that are sufficiently 
defined, the test works to improperly diminish the State's burden." Id. at \ 28. 
Seizing upon this language, Halls, Kinne, and Austin all argued on appeal that their 
convictions were infirm because they had been convicted under jury instructions written in 
compliance with the abandoned Robertson test. See Austin, 2006 UT App 184U, f 1; Kinne, 
2006 UT App 156U, % 2; Halls, 2006 UT App 142, f 10. However, each of the defendants 
was faced with the obstacle that he had failed to preserve the issue at trial. 
Halls sought review under the exceptional circumstances doctrine. See Br. Aplt. at 
13-14 {Halls). The State, citing State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1994), argued that the 
exceptional circumstances doctrine did not apply. See Br. Aple. at 7-9. The court of appeals 
reviewed the claim under the plain error doctrine. Halls, 2006 UT App 142, f 14. Without 
discussing Lopez, it found "an exception to the preservation rule for exceptional 
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circumstances 'where a change in law or the settled interpretation of law colored the failure 
to have raised an issue at trial'" and declined to apply the invited error doctrine. Halls, 2006 
UT App 142, f 13 n. 1. The court ruled that the reasonable doubt instruction "did not convey 
the message that the State must only eliminate those doubts that are sufficiently defined; 
neither did the State argue that the juror need articulate and eliminate specific doubts." Id. 
at If 19. It held that the jury instructions taken as a whole correctly conveyed the principle 
of reasonable doubt. Id. 
Kinne also sought review under the exceptional circumstances doctrine. See Br. Aplt 
at 11 -12 {Kinne). The State argued that any error was invited. See Br. of Aple. at 9-10. The 
court of appeals reached the merits of Kinne 5s reasonable doubt claim without invoking any 
exception to the preservation rule. State v. Kinne, 2006 UT App 156U, Yi 2-3. It held that 
the jury instructions correctly communicated the principle of reasonable doubt. Id. at f^ 3. 
Austin, too, sought review under the exceptional circumstances doctrine. See Br. 
Aplt. at 20 {Austin). The State argued that any error was invited. See Br. Aple. at 7-9. The 
court of appeals reviewed the claim under the plain error doctrine. State v. Austin, 2006 UT 
App 184U, U 1. It held that the jury instructions correctly conveyed the principle of 
reasonable doubt. Id. 
12 
As noted above, the first issue on certiorari, as framed by this Court, is two-fold.3 The 
first sub-question is whether an opinion of this Court on a question of federal law—in this 
case State v. Reyes—issued after a criminal trial but while the direct appeal is pending, 
applies on appeal. This is a question of retroactivity. 
The second sub-question is, assuming that the intervening precedent does apply to the 
criminal appeal, what standard of review governs? This is a question of appellate procedure. 
A. As an intervening decision based on federal law, Reyes applies 
retroactively to these pending cases. 
1. Federal retroactivity rules apply to federal claims. 
The threshold inquiry in determining whether Reyes is entitled to retroactive 
application is determining what law applies. The question of whether to apply the old rule 
or the new one "is a federal one where the rule at issue itself derives from federal law, 
constitutional or otherwise." Jim Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 534-35 
(1991), superseded by statute as stated in Marks v. CDW Computer Centers, Inc., 901 F. 
Supp. 1302, 1313 (N.D. 111. 1995); Kennecott Corp. v. State Tax Comm 'n, 862 P.2d 1348, 
1351 (Utah 1993) (quoting Jim Beam). "The Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl.2, 
does not allow federal retroactivity doctrine to be supplanted by the invocation of a contrary 
3
 The precise wording of the first question on certiorari is as follows: 
1. Whether this Court's holding in State v. Reyes, 116 P.3d 305 (Utah 
2005), applied to the court of appeals' consideration of Petitioners' appeals, 
and whether the court of appeals erred in reviewing Petitioners' challenges to 
the reasonable doubt instruction for plain error. 
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approach to retroactivity under state law." Harper v. Virginia Dep }t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 
86, 100 (1993). Thus, "[wjhatever freedom state courts may enjoy to limit the retroactive 
operation of their own interpretations of state law cannot extend to their interpretations of 
federal law." Id. (citations omitted); Labrum v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 870 P.2d 902, 
912 n.9 (Utah 1993) (recognizing this rule). 
Reyes decided a question of federal constitutional law. Because Reyes challenged the 
reasonable doubt instruction under the United States Constitution and raised no claim under 
the Utah Constitution, this Court "restricted] [its] inquiry to the federal constitution." Reyes, 
2005 UT 33, f 19. Therefore, federal retroactivity rules apply. 
2, A new rule of federal constitutional law applies to pending appeals. 
"[A] new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively 
to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final, with no exception for 
cases in which the new rule constitutes a 'clear break5 with the past." Griffith v. Kentucky, 
479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987) (holding that Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), applied 
retroactively to a state conviction pending on direct review at the time of the Batson 
decision); see State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 591 (Utah 1988) (applying Batson retroactively). 
To do otherwise, the Court declared, would violate "basic norms of constitutional 
adjudication." Griffith, 479 U.S. at 322. First, a court adjudicates only "cases" and 
"controversies." Unlike a legislature, a court does not "promulgate new rales of 
constitutional criminal procedure on a broad basis." Id. Accordingly, it must "resolve all 
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cases before [it] on direct review in light of [its] best understanding of governing 
constitutional principles . . ." Id. at 323 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667,679 
(1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment)). Second, "selective application of new rules 
violates the principle of treating similarly situated defendants the same." Id. 
The Griffith Court abandoned the "clear break exception." Id. at 325,328. Under that 
exception, "a new constitutional rule was not applied retroactively, even to cases on direct 
review, if the new rule explicitly overruled a past precedent of [the] Court, or disapproved 
a practice [the] Court had arguably sanctioned in prior cases, or overturned a longstanding 
practice that lower courts had uniformly approved." Id. (citation omitted). 
Because Reyes applied a rule of federal constitutional law, and new rules of federal 
constitutional law have retroactive effect, Reyes has retroactive effect. It applies to these 
appeals.4 
4
 The state rule appears to be the same. This Court has held that when it has 
established "a new rule on an essential element of a crime, a criminal defendant whose direct 
appeal was pending was entitled to the benefit of the new rule for the resolution of his 
appeal." State v. Norton, 675 P.2d 577 (Utah 1983) (citing State v. Belgard, 615 P.2d 1274 
(Utah 1980)), overruled on other grounds, State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421,427 (Utah 1986). 
However, changes in the law "expressly declared to be prospective in operation," State v. 
Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 406 n.7 (Utah 1994), such as when this Court articulates a "new 
cautionary policy" under it supervisory powers, do not apply retroactively, even to pending 
appeals. State v. Gordon, 913 P.2d 350, 353-55 (Utah 1996). 
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B. The invited error doctrine bars review of these claims. 
That Reyes is entitled to retroactive effect does not mean that defendants are entitled 
to pursue their reasonable doubt claims on appeal. Rules of review still apply. Under 
applicable rules, defendants' claims are barred by the invited error doctrine. 
1. State preservation rules apply to federal claims. 
Questions of preservation and standards of review are matters of state law, even when 
the claim to be determined is grounded in federal law. This Court has long recognized that, 
"in general, appellate courts will not consider an issue, including constitutional arguments, 
raised for the first time on appeal unless the trial court committed plain error or the case 
involves exceptional circumstances." State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, ^ 13, 95 P.3d 276 (citing 
State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, If 11, 10 P.3d 346). Similarly, in Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 
105 (1973), the Supreme Court looked to whether the Indiana Supreme Court had regarded 
Hess's "actions in the state courts as sufficient under state law to preserve his constitutional 
arguments on appeal." Id. at 106 n.2. 
This Court has examined at length the question of whether federal or state standards 
of review apply to claims based on federal law. See State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256,1266-
67 (Utah 1993). It concluded that, "absent an express federal statement to the contrary, state 
courts are not bound by federal standards when reviewing state trial court determinations of 
federal constitutional issues . . . " Id. at 1267. Thus, "the standard of review is a question to 
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be determined by the law of the forum performing the appellate review"—that is, the state. 
Id. at 1266-67. 
2. State preservation rules bar review of invited errors. 
In cases not involving intervening decisions, the rules of review are clear. Claims of 
error fall into one of three categories based on how they were handled in the trial court: 
preserved, forfeited, or—as in these cases—invited. 
"Generally speaking, a timely and specific objection must be made [at trial] in order 
to preserve an issue for appeal." State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, ] 14,128 P.3d 1171 (quoting 
State v. Finder, 2005 UT 15, \ 45, 114 P.3d 551). A preserved issue will be reviewed on 
appeal under the ordinary rules: the appellant bears the burden to demonstrate error and, 
usually, prejudice. State v. Robison, 2006 UT 65, ^ f 21.5 
An appellant may fail to object at trial. If so, his claim of error is considered waived 
or, more properly, forfeited. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725,733 (1993) ("Waiver 
is different from forfeiture. Whereas forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of 
a right, waiver is the 'intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.'") 
(quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,464 (1938)); State v. Pedockie, 2006 UT 28, If 31, 
5
 In the case of non-constitutional trial error, the appellant must demonstrate prejudice 
or harm. See, e.g., State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 919-20 (Utah 1987). In the case of 
constitutional error, once the appellant has demonstrated error, the burden shifts to the 
government to prove that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v. 
California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). In the rare case of structural error, a showing of error 
alone requires reversal. An erroneous beyond-reasonable-doubt instruction is structural 
error. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993). 
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137 P.3d 716 ("While waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right, . . . 
'forfeiture results in the loss of a right regardless of the defendant's knowledge thereof and 
irrespective of whether the defendant intended to relinquish the right.'") (quoting United 
States v. Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092, 1100 (3rd Cir. 1995)), 
The preservation rule has two exceptions. This Court has "consistently held that a 
defendant who fails to preserve an objection at trial will not be able to raise that objection 
on appeal unless he is able to demonstrate either plain error or exceptional circumstances." 
State v. King, 2006 UT 3, ^  13,131 P.3d 202 (citing State v. Cram, 2002 UT 37, % 9,46 P.3d 
230; Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Utah 1996)). 
To establish plain error, the appellant must show "(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error 
should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful." State v. Dunn, 850 
P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). However, "the obviousness requirement poses no rigid and 
insurmountable barrier to review." State v. Eldredge, 113 P.2d 29, 35 n.8 (Utah 1989). An 
appellate court may exercise its discretion "to dispense with the requirement of obviousness 
so that justice can be done, as when an error not readily apparent to the court or counsel 
proves harmful in retrospect." Id. "At bottom, the plain error rule's purpose is to permit [the 
court] to avoid injustice." Id. 
The exceptional circumstances exception is "ill-defined" and "applies primarily to rare 
procedural anomalies." Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1209 n.3 (citing State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 
920, 926 (Utah App. 1991)). Courts employ this "safety device" sparingly, "reserving it for 
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the most unusual circumstances, where . . . failure to consider an issue that was not properly 
preserved for appeal would have resulted in manifest injustice." State v. Nelson- Waggoner, 
2004 UT 29, \ 23, 94 P.3d 186 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
A defendant may also "assert ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to preserve 
the issue." State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 114, f 21 n.2,61 P.3d 1062. Although sometimes cast 
as an exception to the preservation rule, see Cram, 2002 UT 37, ^ f 4, ineffective assistance 
differs from plain error and exceptional circumstances: the latter permit appellate review of 
a claim of trial court error, while the former permits review of a claim of attorney error.6 
The appellate court will decline to consider a claim if the appellant treats an 
unpreserved claim of error as if it were preserved—that is, if he fails to argue plain error or 
exceptional circumstances. State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 1995). 
A litigant may go further than simply not preserving an error in the trial court; he may 
invite it. "[U]nder the doctrine of invited error, [this Court has] declined to engage in even 
plain error review when 'counsel, either by statement or act, affirmatively represented to the 
[trial] court that he or she had no objection to the [proceedings]." State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 
4,114,128 P.3d 1171 (quoting State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, f 54, 70 P.3d 111) (first set 
of brackets added). " A jury instruction may not be assigned as error, even if such instruction 
would otherwise constitute manifest injustice, 'if counsel, either by statement or act, 
6
 None of these defendants has claimed that his trial counsel was ineffective for 
approving an instruction requiring the state to eliminate all reasonable doubt. 
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affirmatively represented to the court that he or she had no obj ection to the jury instruction.'" 
State v. Finder, 2005 UT 15, \ 62, 114 P.3d 551 (quoting State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, If 
54, 70 P.3d 111); see also State v. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, f 9, 86 P.3d 742. 
Consequently, "where invited error butts up against manifest injustice [or plain error], the 
invited error rule prevails." State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201, 1206 (Utah App.1991). 
Here, defendants at trial invited the error they complain of on appeal. Consequently, 
unless the invited error doctrine is trumped by a change in the law, their appellate claim is 
barred. 
3. Preservation rules generally apply to claims based on a change in 
the law. 
Defendants here claim that the invited error doctrine does not apply—and the 
exceptional circumstances exception does—because the law changed after they approved the 
jury instructions they now attack on appeal. Br. Halls at 8; Br. Kinne at 8-9; Br. Austin at 
9-10. 
Under this Court's precedent, the general rule is that ordinary rules of review apply 
when an intervening decision applies retroactively to a "pipeline" case pending on appeal. 
See State v. Benny Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1994); State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 332 (Utah 
1993). However, in at least one pipeline case, this Court has, to avert a manifest injustice, 
reached the merits of an unpreserved claim based on a new rule. See State v. Haston, 846 
P.2d 1276 (Utah 1993) (per curiam). 
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Olsen was the first case following the general rule. Olsen was convicted of 
aggravated robbery. Olsen, 860 P.2d at 333. After his trial, this Court issued State v. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991), which established state due process standards for the 
admissibility of eyewitness identification testimony. On appeal, Olsen argued that 
identification testimony was admitted at his trial in violation of Ramirez. This Court held 
that "this claim was not properly preserved for appeal because defendant failed to object on 
constitutional grounds when the trial court admitted the eyewitness identification evidence.55 
Id. at 335. 
Lopez is to the same effect. Benny Lopez was convicted of child sex abuse. Lopez, 
886 P.2d at 1108. At trial, a photo array was admitted without objection. On appeal, after 
Ramirez had been decided, Lopez relied on Ramirez to argue that the photo array was 
impermissibly suggestive under state due process. Id. at 1113. 
In addressing "whether Lopez may now raise that issue on appeal," this Court applied 
ordinary preservation rules: "The general rule is that issues not raised at trial cannot be 
argued for the first time on appeal, and this rule applies to constitutional questions." Id. 
(citation omitted). It continued, "Lopez cannot raise the issue of state due process for the 
first time on appeal because he has not demonstrated that the 'plain error' or 'exceptional 
circumstances' exceptions exist." Id. Thus, this Court did not regard a change in the law 
as an exceptional circumstance excusing Lopez's failure to preserve his Ramirez issue. The 
Court also noted that it had "already held that it will not hear issues based on Ramirez that 
were not raised at trial." Id. (citing Olsen, 860 P.2d at 335). 
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Olsen and Lopez are in line with many jurisdictions that apply a retroactive 
intervening decision to a pipeline case only when appellants preserved their claims at trial. 
See, e.g., Martinez v. Texas Dept. ofCriminalJustice, 300 F.3d 567,573-575 (5th Cir. 2002) 
(refusing to reach unpreserved issue despite change in law); State v. Martinez, 896 A.2d 109, 
166 n.3 (Conn. App. 2006) ("To allow the defendant to raise this issue for the first time on 
appeal would produce a substantially inequitable result."); Corona v. State, 929 So.2d 588, 
592-93 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (generic "confrontation" objection insufficient to preserve 
Crawford claim); State v. Turecek, 456 N.W.2d 219, 222 (Iowa 1990) (defendant who 
preserves error is entitled to benefit of change in law) (citing State v. McNabb, 241 N.W.2d 
32, 33-34 (Iowa 1976)); Commonwealth v. Pidge, 509 N.E.2d 281, 283 (Mass. 1987) 
("where an issue is properly preserved and pending on direct appeal, the defendant is entitled 
to the benefit of a new rule of law announced after his trial"); People v. Hill, 648 N.E.2d 455, 
458 (N.Y. 1995) ("where the issue has been properly preserved," intervening decision is 
retroactive to pipeline cases); Commonwealth v. Ardestani, 736 A.2d 552, 555 (Penn. 1999) 
(a "new rule is to be applied retroactively to cases where the issue in question is properly 
preserved at all stages of adjudication up to and including any direct appeal"); Ellis County 
State Bank v. Keever, 888 S.W.2d 790, 799 (Tex. 1994) (intervening decision applies to 
pending case in which a party has preserved the error).7 
7
 Other jurisdictions take approaches more lenient to appellants. See, e.g., Martinez, 
300 F.3d at 573-575 (reviewing approaches of Fourth, Tenth, D.C., and Federal Circuits); 
United States v. Keys, 133 F.3d 1282, 1287 (9th Cir. 1998) (changes in the law will be 
accorded retroactive effect under federal plain error review); People v. Lonsby, 707 N.W.2d 
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Haston represents the exception to this general rule. It predates Olsen and Lopez but 
was not cited in them. Haston shot a man at close range during a drunken quarrel. Id. at 
1277 n. 1. He was convicted of attempted depraved indifference murder. Id. at 1277. After 
trial, this Court in State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843 (Utah 1992), held that Utah does not recognize 
the crime of attempted depraved indifference homicide. Id. The State argued that defendant 
could not make a Vigil claim for the first time on certiorari. In a per curiam opinion, this 
Court entertained the claim, reversed, and remanded for a new trial. Id. 
Without referring to "exceptional circumstances" or citing any authority, it held that 
failing to consider defendant's claim would result in a manifest injustice for two reasons. 
First, Haston had raised the issue in a footnote in his brief before the court of appeals, as well 
as in a petition for rehearing. Id. But more fundamentally, the Court feared that "defendant 
may presently be incarcerated for a crime which is not recognized in Utah." Id. "Under such 
circumstances," it wrote, "failure to consider defendant's assigned error merely because he 
was tardy or inartful in raising the issue previously strikes us as manifestly unjust." Id. The 
brief opinion does not discuss whether Haston invited any error in the trial court.8 
610, 621-22 (Mich. App. 2005) (issue "'preserved' . . . by operation of law" when law 
changes). 
8
 State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5 (Utah App. 1996), cites State v. Gerard Lopez, 873 P.2d 
1127 (Utah 1994), and State v. Haston, 846 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1993), in support of its assertion 
that this Court has "employed the 'exceptional circumstances' rubric where a change in law 
or the settled interpretation of law colored the failure to have raised an issue at trial." Id. at 
10. Haston is discussed in text. 
Gerard Lopez did not involve an attempt to reverse the trial court based on an 
intervening change in the law. Police found cocaine in Gerard Lopez's vehicle during an 
inventory search. Id. at 1129. The trial court granted Lopez's motion to suppress under the 
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Plotting Olsen, Lopez, and Haston yields the following rule: a retroactive, intervening 
change in the law does not, without more, abrogate ordinary preservation rules, but 
exceptional circumstances may justify review where (1) defendant acted promptly in 
asserting the claim, and (2) failure to apply the new rule would work a manifest injustice on 
the order of punishing someone for non-criminal act. 
This rule is rational. At trial, a litigant who feels aggrieved by a rule may challenge 
it or he may forego the challenge. What he may not do is forego the challenge at trial and 
on appeal enjoy the benefits of having mounted the challenge. Had Austin, Kinne, or Halls 
believed that a Robertson instruction prejudiced them at trial, they could have objected. Had 
they done so, an appellate court could, under Lopez, have reached the merits of the claims 
and applied Reyes. But defendants were not entitled both to enjoy the benefits of the 
Robertson test at trial and to attack it on appeal. 
The court of appeals has taken a scattershot approach in applying preservation rules 
to claims based on new rules. In State v. Duanyai, 2004 UT App 349U, cert, denied, 109 
pretext doctrine. Id. The court of appeals reversed, but declined the State's invitation to 
abandon the pretext doctrine. Id. This Court granted cross-petitions for certiorari. Id. 
For the first time on certiorari Lopez argued that this Court should adopt the pretext 
doctrine under the Utah Constitution. Id. at 1134 n.2. The State argued that this argument 
had been waived. This Court ruled that "exceptional circumstances" justified entertaining 
this argument on certiorari. Id. (citations omitted). It reasoned that because at the time of 
the suppression hearing the pretext doctrine was the controlling rule of Fourth Amendment 
law as interpreted by the court of appeals, defendant had no reason to argue that the doctrine 
should be adopted under the state constitution. Id. 
Lopez stands for the unremarkable proposition that a litigant who prevails in the trial 
court need not preserve an alternative ground in the trial court in order to argue it on appeal. 
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P.3d 804 (Utah 2005), the court of appeals correctly applied ordinary rules of review while 
properly giving retroactive application to an intervening decision of the United States 
Supreme Court. It (1) ruled that Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) applied 
retroactively to the case under review; (2) noted that Duanyai had not preserved his cross-
examination claim; and (3) reviewed the claim under plain error. Duanyai, 2004 UT App 
349U, ffif 1-3 (unnumbered). It found no error. Id. 
In Halls, one of the cases at bar, Halls attacked on appeal the very reasonable doubt 
instruction he had expressly approved at trial, thus inviting any error. Halls, 2006 UT App 
142, % 13 n. 1. The court of appeals stated, "Utah law has not addressed whether the invited 
error doctrine applies when there has been a change of settled law." Id. Although 
technically true, this statement is misleading, since in Olsen and Lopez this Court held that 
mere failure to object—a less egregious transgression than inviting the error—precluded 
appellate review, notwithstanding an intervening change in law. See Olsen, 860 P.2d at 335; 
Lopez, 886 P.2d at 1113. The court of appeals then held that a change in law was an 
exceptional circumstance, permitting plain error review. Halls, 2006 UT App 142, ^ } 13 n.l 
(citing United States v. West Indies Transp.y Inc., Ill F.3d 299,305 (3d Cir. 1997)); see also 
State v. Miranda, 22 P.3d 506, 507 n.l (Ariz. 2001) (en banc) ("the doctrine of invited error 
does not apply when the error is based on a change in the law after the defendant's trial"). 
The court of appeals found no error, id. at % 19, and thus did not reach the question of how 
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a claim of error based on a post-trial change in the law could ever have been obvious to the 
trial court.9 
In Kinne, another of the cases on review here, the court of appeals simply held the 
reasonable doubt instruction correct without discussing a standard of review or explaining 
why review was not precluded by defendant's having invited the error. See Kinne, 2006 UT 
Appl56U,1f3. 
In Austin, the third case on review here, the court of appeals applied the plain error 
standard without discussing why the invited error doctrine did not bar review or how plain 
error's obviousness prong could apply to a claim based on a change in the law. See Austin, 
2006UTAppl84U, t l . 
In State v. Wareham, 2006 UT App 327,143 P.3d 302,10 the court of appeals applied 
the invited error rule. Wareham involved a Reyes reasonable-doubt-instruction issue. At 
trial, Wareham "not only affirmatively approved of the use of the word obviate, but actually 
insisted that it be inserted into the instructions." Id. at 116. On appeal, he relied on Reyes 
to attack the instructions. Id. at f 14. The court of appeals "decline[d] to address this issue 
as invited error." Id. at \ 16. This is the only one of the Reyes challenges where the court 
of appeals acknowledged that the defendant had invited the error he complained of on appeal. 
9
 The federal rule on plain error is that "where the law at the time of trial was settled 
and clearly contrary to the law at the time of appeal[,] it is enough that an error be 'plain' at 
the time of appellate consideration." Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468 (1997). 
However, as noted above, questions regarding preservation and standards of review are 
matters of state law. 
10
 Cross-petitions for certiorari are pending in Wareham. 
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In State v. Phipps, 2006 UT App 372U, the court of appeals reverted to its earlier 
stance, refusing to invoke invited error and ruling instead that the exceptional circumstances 
concept "maybe employed 'where a change in law or the settled interpretation of law colored 
the failure to have raised an issue at tr ial . . . '" Id. at ^ | 2 n. 1 (quoting State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 
5,10 (Utah App. 1996)). See also State v. Hargraves, 806 P.2d 228,232 (Utah App. 1991) 
(ruling that a change in law constitutes an exceptional circumstance, since under existing law 
"it would have been futile to raise the issue"). 
In none of the foregoing cases did the court of appeals cite Benny Lopez, 886 P.2d 
1105, this Court's clearest treatment of the question of the interplay between preservation 
rules and retroactive changes in the law. 
In sum, when faced with a retroactive change in the law, this Court should follow the 
rule of Olsen, Lopez, and Haston: an intervening, retroactive change in the law does not 
constitute an exceptional circumstance abrogating ordinary rules of preservation except 
where necessary to avert a manifest injustice. Part of the manifest injustice inquiry is 
considering whether the appellant acted reasonably in attempting to bring the claim before 
a court promptly. Neither Olsen, Lopez, nor Haston involved invited error, although it is 
instructive that part of this Court's rationale for reaching Haston's claim of error was that he 
had acted reasonably in pressing his Vigil claim. 
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4. No "exceptional circumstances" exist here because these 
defendants were on notice that Robertson was "constitutionally 
flawed" and face no manifest injustice. 
Defendants here seek to avoid the invited error doctrine on the ground that the law 
changed after they approved the instructions they now assail on appeal. Br. Halls at 8; Br. 
Kinne at 8-9; Br. Austin at 9-10. As demonstrated above, a change in the law without more 
will not excuse an appellant from compliance with the ordinary rules of preservation and 
appellate review except to avert a serious manifest injustice, and then only if the appellant 
himself has acted with diligence. Moreover, invited error appears to trump even exceptional 
circumstances. 
These defendants invited any error by approving at trial the instructions they now 
challenge on appeal. This Court has never suggested that the safety device of exceptional 
circumstances could be invoked to excuse invited error. That would permit a party to "take 
advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into committing 
the error.5" Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, H 9 (quoting State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107,1109 
(Utah 1996) (in turn quoting Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1220) (internal quotation omitted)). See 
also Wareham, 2006 UT App 327, f 16 (declining to address a claim based on a change of 
law on the ground that any error was invited). 
However, even if in an appropriate case this Court were inclined to carve out a 
change-of-law exception to the invited error doctrine, this is not the case. Application of 
settled rules of review here will not "result[] in manifest injustice." Nelson- Waggoner, 2004 
UT 29,1j 23. 
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The primary rationale for reviewing an issue premised on a change in the law is that 
a defendant should not be held to have forfeited a claim "by failing to raise it before the 
theory on which his argument is premised has been sufficiently developed to put him on 
notice that the issue is a live issue." Commonwealth v. Bowler, 553 N.E.2d 534, 536 (Mass. 
1990) (holding that defendant was not entitled to unpreserved claim based on new rule where 
rule was reasonably foreseeable). "Counsel," it is said, "need not be 'clairvoyant'" Id. Here, 
however, "clairvoyance of counsel was not required." Id. Although this Court had not yet 
overruled Robertson, the court of appeals' Reyes opinion "put the defendants] fairly on 
notice" that challenging the constitutionality of the Robertson test "was a reasonably arguable 
proposition." Id. 
The confluence of three factors put these defendants on notice that, at the time of their 
trials, the Robertson test was precarious. First, even a cursory reading of Victor suggests that 
any formal requirements for reasonable doubt instructions are constitutionally suspect. See 
Victor, 511 U.S. at 5. Second, even if that fact was not obvious from Victor itself, the^eourt 
of appeals had, before these defendants' trials, unanimously pronounced the Robertson three-
part test "constitutionally flawed" under Victor. State v. Reyes, 2004 UT App 8, % 22, 84 
P.3d 841. Finally, this Court had granted the State's petition for certiorari in Reyes, a clue 
that this Court was at least open to the possibility of overruling Robertson. See State v. 
Reyes, 94 P.3d 929 (2004). 
Defendants were not blind-sided. On the contrary, they "had reasonable grounds for 
declining to propose—and if necessary, stating an objection to—the . . . instruction that 
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instead they asked the court to give." Maiz v. Virani, 253 F.3d 641, 677 (11th Cir. 2001) 
(refusing to "carve out an exception to the invited error rule"). Rather than approving the 
reasonable doubt instruction, they could have "in good faith asserted an objection to it with 
an eye toward arguing for a more favorable standard before this Court . . ." Id. 
Of course, defendants had little reason to object to the Robertson instruction. The 
instruction is generally regarded as defense-favorable. Although this Court rejected the 
Robertson test at least in part because it was able to conceive of a circumstance in which the 
Robertson test might "diminish the degree of proof necessary to convict," the Court also 
acknowledged that this tendency was "contrary to [the standard's] purpose." Reyes, 2005 UT 
33, *! 27. Indeed, the Robertson standard has traditionally been seen as a defense-favorable 
rule. Certainly the rule's originator, Justice Stewart, conceived it that way. See Johnson, 
11A P.2d at 1147 (Stewart, J., concurring, with two judges concurring) (arguing that a 
reasonable doubt instruction violating the second factor of what would become the Robertson 
test permitted conviction on "something less than evidence proving guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt"); Ireland, 113 P.2d at 13 82 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (arguing that third factor of what 
would become the Robertson test was necessary because a contrary instruction would 
"diminish the prosecution's burden of proof'). 
Accordingly, convicting defendants under a Robertson-compliant instruction did not 
result in manifest injustice here. Indeed, since Justice Stewart garnered a third vote in 
Johnson in 1989, defendants in Utah have been convicted under instructions stating that the 
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State must obviate all reasonable doubt. It is inconceivable that all these convictions are 
manifestly unjust. 
Because this case poses no danger of manifest injustice, this Court should invoke the 
invited error doctrine and leave for another day the question of whether an unforeseeable, 
defense-favorable change in the law can ever constitute an exceptional circumstance 
relieving a litigant from the consequences of having invited the error he claims on appeal. 
5* Any review of defendants' claims should be conducted under the 
first and third prongs of the plain error standard. 
Should this Court conclude that exceptional circumstances require entertaining the 
merits of defendants' claims, the first and third prongs of the plain error standard—error and 
harm—should apply. The second cannot. 
The second prong of the plain error standard is that "the error should have been 
obvious to the trial court." Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208. This prong of the plain error test can 
never be met where trial proceedings are reviewed under an opinion issued after trial, 
because it will never have been obvious to the trial court that its actions would violate a 
future precedent. But to apply the obviousness prong in appeals applying retroactive 
precedents would make the obviousness requirement a "rigid and insurmountable barrier to 
review." Eldredge, 113 P.2d at 35 n.8. And the exceptional circumstances exception applies 
only in cases, like Haston, where application of the ordinary preservation rules would work 
a grave and manifest injustice. In that circumstance, review is required even where the 
manifest injustice would not have been obvious to the trial court. 
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The remaining two factors—error and harm—must be shown, however. This Court 
in State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45, 122 P.3d 543, struggled with whether to require a showing of 
harm in a circumstance, such as this, where under ordinary circumstances the error would be 
structural. It reviewed a challenge to a reasonable doubt instruction under the plain error 
standard, because Cruz had not preserved the error at trial (and apparently had not invited it). 
Id. at Tf 16. The Cruz court noted that plain error requires a showing of harm. Id. at f^ 16. 
The Court also noted, that "[ejrroneous reasonable doubt instructions . . . give rise to 
structural errors." Id. at \ 17 (citing Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993)). 
The Court went on to note that the United States Supreme Court has held that "a 
defendant claiming constitutional error who did not object at trial may only argue plain error 
or ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal and thus must prove prejudice, even if the 
constitutional error claimed on appeal is structural in nature." Id. at f 18 (citing United 
States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993); Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 464-67 
(1997)). However, the Cruz court did not decide the issue because it found no error. 
If this Court reaches this issue, it should follow the lead of the Supreme Court and 
require a showing of harm as well as error. The exceptional circumstances doctrine is a 
"safety device" reserved "for the most unusual circumstances, where . . . failure to consider 
an issue that was not properly preserved for appeal would have resulted in manifest 
injustice." Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, \ 23. No claim that an action of the trial court 
has worked a manifest injustice can be taken seriously unless a defendant demonstrates a 
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reasonable likelihood that, absent the challenged action, a different result would have 
obtained at trial. 
Thus, in circumstances where a preserved challenge to an erroneous reasonable doubt 
instruction would require reversal as structural error, a challenge brought under the plain 
error standard should result in reversal only where the instruction was so flawed and the 
State's case so equivocal that defendant would not have been convicted under a correct 
instruction. Defendants here do not assert harm from the reasonable doubt instruction. 
IL 
INSTRUCTING THE JURY THAT THE STATE MUST "ELIMINATE 
ALL REASONABLE DOUBT," THOUGH NOT CONSTITUTIONALLY 
MANDATED, WAS NOT ERRONEOUS 
The second question presented on certiorari is whether the instruction that the State's 
evidence must "eliminate all reasonable doubt" constituted reversible error in light of this 
Court's holding in Reyes. 
Jury instructions. Each of the defendants' cases was tried by the same district judge, 
who gave the following reasonable doubt instruction in the Halls and Kinne trials: 
A defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt. This presumption follows the defendant throughout the trial. 
If a defendant's guilt is not shown beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant 
should be acquitted. 
The state must eliminate all reasonable doubt. Proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt is not proof to an absolute certainty. Reasonable doubt is a 
doubt based on reason, which is reasonable in view of all the evidence. 
Reasonable doubt is not a doubt based on fancy, imagination, or wholly 
speculative possibility. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is enough proof to 
satisfy the mind, or convince the understanding of those bound to act 
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conscientiously, and enough to eliminate reasonable doubt. A reasonable 
doubt is a doubt that reasonable people would entertain based upon the 
evidence in the case. 
R. 113 (Halls) (addendum C); R. 104 (Kinne) (addendum D). The reasonable doubt 
instruction given in Austin was materially identical: 
A defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt. This presumption follows the defendant throughout the trial. 
If a defendant's guilt is not proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant 
should be acquitted. 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not proof to an absolute certainty. 
It is the burden of the State to eliminate all reasonable doubt. Reasonable 
doubt is a doubt based on reason, which is reasonable in view of all the 
evidence. Reasonable doubt is not a doubt based on fancy, imagination, or 
wholly speculative possibility. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is enough 
proof to satisfy the mind, or convince the understanding of those bound to act 
conscientiously, and enough to eliminate reasonable doubt. A reasonable 
doubt is a doubt that reasonable people would entertain based upon the 
evidence in the case. 
R. 149 (Austin) (addendum E). In addition, each of the three juries was instructed as follows 
in the stock portion of the elements instruction: 
In order to obtain a conviction, the state must prove each element of the 
offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Those elements are as follows: . . . If you 
believe that the state has proved each of these elements beyond a reasonable 
doubt, you should find defendant guilty. If the state has failed to prove any 
one of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find defendant 
not guilty. 
R. 107-08 (Halls) (addendum C); R. 99-100 (Kinne) (addendum D); R. 143-44 (Austin) 
(addendum E). 
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Analysis. Defendants claim that constitutional standards for reasonable doubt 
instructions "cannot be met as long as the phrase 'eliminate all reasonable doubt' is included 
in the instruction." Br. Halls at 22; Br. Kinne at 24; Br. Austin at 22. 
Preliminarily, defendants criticize the court of appeals for stating that it considered 
"the 'eliminate all reasonable doubt' jury instruction to be less troublesome than the Reyes 
'obviate all reasonable doubt' instruction." Halls, 2006 UT App 142, f 15; see Br. Halls at 
19-21; Br. Kinne at 21-23; Br. Austin at 19-21. The State agrees that "eliminate all 
reasonable doubt/' the phrase employed in these jury instructions, and "obviate all reasonable 
doubt," the phrase required by Robertson, are functional equivalents. 
Defendants' fundamental contention is that constitutional standards for reasonable 
doubt instructions "cannot be met as long as the phrase 'eliminate all reasonable doubt' is 
included in the instruction. Br. Halls at 22; Br. Kinne at 24; Br. Austin at 22. This claim 
reads too much into Reyes. 
This Court in Reyes found the '"obviate all reasonable doubt' concept" "[ijnsightful 
and important," yet "linguistically opaque and conceptually suspect." Reyes, 2005 UT 33, 
126: 
The process suggested by the "obviate all reasonable doubt" standard is also 
flawed because, contrary to its purpose, it tends to diminish the degree of proof 
necessary to convict and in that respect violates the Victor standard. The 
"obviation" of doubt contemplates a two-step undertaking: the identification 
of the doubt and a testing of the validity of the doubt against the evidence. 
This process suggests a back and forth disputation of a doubt's merits, all to 
the end of determining whether the evidence is sufficient to "obviate" the 
doubt. The "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard does not, however, 
condition a conclusion that a doubt is reasonable on an ability either to 
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articulate the doubt or to state a reason for it. An unarticulated conviction that 
the State has failed to meet its burden of proof will serve as a legitimate basis 
to acquit. 
Id. at \ 27. The Court concluded, "[t]o the extent that the Robertson 'obviate5 test would 
permit the State to argue that it need only obviate doubts that are sufficiently defined, the test 
works to improperly diminish the State's burden." Id. at ^ 28. 
The Court's reservations about the obviation instruction appear to be fundamentally 
theoretical. Its analysis on this point is supported by a law review article. See id. at fflf 26-28 
(citing Steve Sheppard, The Metamorphoses of Reasonable Doubt: How Changes in the 
Burden of Proof Have Weakened the Presumption of Innocence, 78 Notre Dame L. Rev. 
1165 (2003)).n The article is an historical and jurisprudential critique of the reasonable 
doubt standard as applied. 
Professor Sheppard assails "the practice of describing reasonable doubts as articulable 
doubts." Id. at 1207. He faults jury instructions that define a reasonable doubt as one "for 
which a reason may be assigned," or as "a serious, sensible doubt, such as you could give a 
good reason for." Id. at 1210. But he goes further, suggesting that every reasonable doubt 
instruction suffers from this infirmity: "Although it may be that every reasonable doubt 
instruction implies a requirement like articulability, the idea that a juror must be able to state 
the doubt on which to acquit the defendant goes very far afield from our view of the 
prosecution having to prove its case to the juror's judgment of certainty." Id. at 1206. 
11
 This article has been cited in one other judicial opinion. See State v. Garcia, 92 
P.3d41, 45 (N.M. App. 2004), reversed in relevant part, 116 P.3d 72 (N.M. 2005). 
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As the foregoing quotation implies, Sheppard questions the reasonable doubt standard. 
"In the realms of both law and popular usage," he declares, "a strong linkage continues 
between reason and identification, such that a reasonable doubt must be identifiable, 
quantifiable, and at the least articulable." Id. at 1223. This is what he calls "the problem of 
reasonable doubt." Id. at 1225. Consequently, he writes, "the current standard of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt has deep normative and descriptive frailties." Id. at 1244. Victor, 
he argues, "str[uck] even more deeply against the requirement of juror certainty," id. at 1218, 
which Sheppard prefers. See id. at 1206 (quoted above), 1217 ("there is no indication that 
the Court considered the idea of reasonable doubt as a lesser standard than the standard of 
certainty that was once offered to the defendants in American courts"). He writes that the 
reasonable doubt instruction is "a limitation on the discretion of the juror," since instructed 
jurors "are not to act independently but only as the law would have them act in their role." 
Id. at 1240. "This particular limit on discretion," he declares, "is one that might be 
fundamentally immoral." Id. 
Professor Sheppard would undoubtedly object to a Robertson instruction. But this 
Court did not adopt Professor Sheppard5 s views in Reyes. Reyes is best understood as having 
overruled, not the Robertson instruction, but the Robertson test. Indeed, that is how 
subsequent decisions of this Court have read Reyes. Reyes was argued the same day as two 
other cases, State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45, ^  21, 122 P.3d 543, and State v. Weaver, 2005 UT 
49, f 7, 122 P.3d 566. Neither applies Sheppard's analysis. 
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In Cruz, this Court noted that, "pursuant to our opinion in Reyes, the Robertson test 
is no longer in force." Id. at f^ 21. Cruz never suggests that the instruction given in 
Robertson was flawed. Indeed, the instructions approved in Cruz instructed the jury at some 
length on how to articulate a reasonable doubt. One instruction was entitled "How to 
Evaluate Reasonable Doubt": 
Instruction seventeen, entitled "What Is a Reasonable Doubt," read: 
A reasonable doubt is one based upon reason and common sense 
rather than speculation, supposition, emotion or sympathy. It is 
the kind of doubt that would make a reasonable person hesitate 
to act. It must be real and not merely imaginary. It is such as 
would be retained by reasonable men and women after a full and 
impartial consideration of all the evidence, and must arise from 
the evidence or lack of evidence in the case. 
Finally, instruction eighteen, entitled "How to Evaluate Doubt," read: 
If after such full and impartial consideration some possible 
doubt exists, you must determine whether such doubt is 
reasonable in light of all the evidence. Ask yourselves if the 
doubt is consistent with reason and common sense. The law 
does not require that the evidence dispel all possible or 
conceivable doubt, but rather that it dispel all reasonable doubt. 
That is what is meant by the phrase "proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt." 
Id. at % 11. This instruction was part of a set of instructions that this Court held "provided 
a clear and accurate definition of proof beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 22. 
Similarly, in Weaver, this Court stated that in Reyes "we overruled the Robertson test 
mandating that a reasonable doubt instruction specifically require the state to 'obviate all 
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reasonable doubt.'" 2005 UT 49, | 7 (citations omitted). Nothing in the Weaver opinion 
casts doubt on the Robertson instruction. 
Cruz and Weaver make clear that the constitutional error lay in the Robertson test, not 
the Robertson instruction. 
Robertson went wrong not by requiring an unconstitutional instruction, but by 
requiring under the aegis of the Constitution what the Constitution does not require. States 
are not free to "interpret the United States Constitution to provide greater protection than [the 
United States Supreme Court's] own federal constitutional precedents provide." Arkansas 
v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769,772 (2001) (citing Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975)); see also 
Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318,326 (1994) (reversing the California Supreme Court's 
holding that a defendant's Miranda rights are triggered when he becomes the focus of an 
officer's undisclosed suspicions); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456,463 
n.6 (1981) (a state court "is not free to impose greater restrictions as a matter of federal 
constitutional law than this Court has imposed"). In particular, "a State may not impose . . 
. greater restrictions as a matter of federal constitutional law when [the United States 
Supreme Court] specifically refrains from imposing them." Hass, 420 U.S. at 719 (1975). 
Robertson violated this principle. In Victor, the Supreme Court specifically refrained 
from imposing any formal requirements on reasonable doubt instructions: "so long as the 
court instructs the jury on the necessity that the defendant's guilt be proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt, the Constitution does not require that any particular form of words be used 
in advising the jury of the government's burden of proof." Victor, 511 U.S. at 5. Yet 
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Robertson required that a particular form of words—"obviate all reasonable doubt"—be used 
in advising the jury of the government's burden of proof. 
In Reyes, this Court deftly sidestepped this pitfall. It suggested a reasonable doubt 
instruction for use in Utah courts, but only as a matter of "guidance," not constitutional 
mandate. Id. at ff 33,35,37. It cautioned that while the instruction was a "safe harbor," any 
reasonable doubt instruction that adequately informs the jury of the State's burden of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt would be found constitutional. Id. at \ 38. Indeed, the Court 
expressly recognized that "defining 'beyond a reasonable doubt' is a process of evolution and 
adaptation, and in the future new definitions may emerge." Id. In Reyes, the Court thus 
navigated between Victor's prohibition on formal requirements (including any requirement 
that the standard be defined at all) and its own felt need to "resolve[] any uncertainty" on the 
question of reasonable doubt instructions. Id. 
In any event, the instructions at issue here did not lower the state's burden of proof, 
even under the strictest analysis that could be attributed to the Reyes opinion. Reyes 
indicated that the "obviate test" diminishes the State's constitutional burden of proof only 
to the extent that it "would permit the State to argue that it need only obviate doubts that are 
sufficiently defined . . ." Id. As the court of appeals observed in Halls, the instruction's 
vulnerability "comes from its potential to allow the State to argue that a juror must articulate 
and obviate specific doubts." Halls, 2006 UT App 142, \ 17. 
The forbidden argument was not made in these cases. Defendants here do not claim, 
nor does the record disclose, that the prosecutors argued that the State need obviate only 
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sufficiently defined doubts. In Halls, referring to the elements instruction, the prosecutor 
stated, "the State has proven everything on this page beyond a reasonable doubt." R. 141: 
165. In rebuttal she stated that defense counsel's "job is to raise a reasonable doubt, and he's 
done the best job he can, but he can't get over the hurdle of the State's evidence in this case." 
R. 141: 177. She thus argued that the State's evidence foreclosed all reasonable doubt. She 
did not argue or imply that "the State . . . need only obviate doubts that are sufficiently 
defined." Reyes, 2005 UT 33, % 28. 
In Kinne, the prosecutor relied on the reasonable doubt instruction: 
There's an instruction that you have that calls upon what's the State's burden 
in a case like this . . . it's called the reasonable doubt instruction. You know, 
we can stand up here and we can speculate and we can say, "You know what, 
the State—the State didn't do this or maybe it was this other person that did 
that, or maybe this occurred, or maybe that occurred," and that all falls under 
one part of this that says: You don't base your decision under this kind of a 
reasonable doubt instruction on speculation, . . . on fanciful imagination or 
wholly speculative possibility. 
What may have occurred, ladies and gentlemen, you have to have some 
scintilla of evidence that something else happened. The only evidence you 
have in this case about what occurred with regard to this burglary and this 
stolen vehicle is what Mr. Clark told you occurred. You don't have any 
evidence to the contrary. And speculation about what may have occurred is 
that, speculation. 
R. 126: 155-56 {Kinne). Again, the prosecutor did not argue or imply that "the State . . . need 
only obviate doubts that are sufficiently defined." Reyes, 2005 UT 33, f 28. He never 
suggested any requirement that doubts be defined or articulated, only that they be reasonable 
in light of the evidence adduced at trial. 
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In Austin, the prosecutor stated merely "that reasonable doubt is a doubt based on 
reason, which is reasonable in view of all the evidence." R. 222: 134 (Austin). This 
statement is unassailable, if tautological. She did not argue or imply that "the State . . . need 
only obviate doubts that are sufficiently defined." Reyes, 2005 UT 33, ^  28. 
The jury instructions given in these cases were also unobjectionable. Jury instructions 
must be viewed "as a whole." Cruz, 2005 UT 45, f 22. So viewed, the instructions are 
consistent with the principles elaborated in Reyes. 
The reasonable doubt instructions here did inform the jury that the state bore the 
burden to "eliminate all reasonable doubt." R. 149 (Austin)', R. 104 (Kinne); R. 113 (Halls). 
However, read in context, this instruction did not offend Reyes. 
The reasonable doubt instruction gave "an affirmative description of the degree of 
conviction that must be attained by a juror based on the evidence" as required by Reyes: 
"Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is enough proof to satisfy the mind, or convince the 
understanding of those bound to act conscientiously, and enough to eliminate reasonable 
doubt." R. 149 (Austin); R. 104 (Kinne); R. 113 (Halls); see Reyes, 2005 UT 33, f 29. Like 
Reyes's "safe harbor" instruction, this instruction states that "[p]roof beyond a reasonable 
doubt is not proof to an absolute certainty." R. 149 (Austin); R. 104 (Kinne); R. 113 (Halls); 
Reyes, 2005 UT 33, ^  37. And when it does define reasonable doubt, the instruction tends 
to speak in unobjectionable, if not tautological, terms: "Reasonable doubt is a doubt based 
on reason, which is reasonable in view of all the evidence . . . A reasonable doubt is a doubt 
42 
that reasonable people would entertain based upon the evidence in the case." R. 149 
(Austin); R. 104 (Kinne); R. 113 (Halls). 
Moreover, the stock portions of the elements instruction given in each case repeatedly 
directed jurors to scrutinize the strength of the State's case: 
In order to obtain a conviction, the state must prove each element of the 
offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Those elements are as follows:... If you 
believe that the state has proved each of these elements beyond a reasonable 
doubt, you should find defendant guilty. If the state has failed to prove any 
one of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find defendant 
not guilty. 
R. 107-08 (Halls) (emphasis added); R. 79-80 (Kinne) (same); R. 143-44 (Austin) (same). 
Under this instruction, "the juror who has a doubt based on the belief that the totality of the 
evidence is insufficient" would be required to acquit. Reyes, 2005 UT 33, f^ 28 (quoting 
Sheppard, supra, at 1213). 
Thus, the dangers cautioned against in Reyes never arose in these cases. Although a 
Robertson "eliminate all reasonable doubt" instruction was given, the prosecutor did not 
make the forbidden argument, and the instructions as a whole directed the jury to deliberate 
in a manner consistent with the principles expressed in Reyes. 
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5jc # # 
Defendants waived their Robertson claims by inviting any error in the trial court. 
Even if, in an appropriate case, this Court were inclined to employ the exceptional 
circumstances safety device to trump invited error, it should not do so here, because 
defendants suffered no manifest injustice. Being tried under an obviation instruction, as most 
Utah defendants for the last quarter century have been, is not manifestly unjust. 
Reyes is best understood as overruling the Robertson test, not the Robertson 
instruction. Therefore, the mere fact that an obviation instruction was given here did not 
violate constitutional requirements. But even if an obviation instruction is viewed as opening 
the door to constitutional error, none resulted here. The prosecutors did not argue that a 
reasonable doubt must be defined before it could serve as the basis for an acquittal. In 
addition, the jury instructions read as a whole satisfactorily informed the jury of the State's 
burden to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the court of appeals should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted on _L(_ December 2006. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
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C 
State v. HallsUtah App.,2006. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Franklin Eric HALLS, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 20040939-CA. 
April 13, 2006. 
Background: Defendant was convicted in the 
District Court, Monticello Department, Lyle R. 
Anderson, J., of unlawful possession of a controlled 
substance, unlawful possession of an imitation 
controlled substance, and possession of 
paraphernalia. Defendant appealed. 
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Judith M. Billings 
, J., held that: 
(1) reasonable doubt instruction correctly 
communicated to jury the principle of reasonable 
doubt, and 
(2) Court of Appeals would not review issue of 
whether trial court erred in enhancing defendant's 
sentence based on a prior conviction of possession 
of a controlled substance, as defendant invited the 
error. 
Affirmed. 
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So long as the court instructs the jury on the 
necessity that defendant's guilt be proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt, the Constitution does not require 
that any particular form of words be used in 
advising the jury of the government's burden of 
proof; rather, taken as a whole, the instructions must 
© 2006 ThomsonAVest. No CI* 
correctly convey the concept of reasonable doubt to 
the jury. 
[7] Criminal Law 110 €==>822(16) 
110 Criminal Law 
110XX Trial 
IIOXX(G) Instructions: Necessity, 
Requisites, and Sufficiency 
110k822 Constmction and Effect of 
Charge as a Whole 
110k822(16) k. Reasonable Doubt. 
Most Cited Cases 
Reasonable doubt instruction, which included 
phrase that state had to "eliminate all reasonable 
doubt," taken as a whole, correctly communicated 
to jury the principle of reasonable doubt, in drug 
prosecution; instruction did not convey message 
that state only had to eliminate those doubts that 
were sufficiently defined, and neither did state 
argue that juror needed to articulate and eliminate 
specific doubts. 
[8] Criminal Law 110 €=>1137(2) 
110 Criminal Law 
110XXIV Review 
1 lOXXTV(L) Scope of Review in General 
1 lOkl 135 Parties Entitled to Allege Error 
llOkl 137 Estoppel 
llOkl 137(2) k. Error Comrnitted or 
Invited by Party Complaining in General. Most 
Cited Cases 
Appellate court would not review on appeal issue of 
whether trial court erred in enhancing defendant's 
sentence based on a prior conviction of possession 
of a controlled substance, on basis that judgment 
from prior conviction incorrectly stated that he pled 
guilty to possession with intent to distribute, when 
he had actually pled guilty to simple possession, as 
defendant invited the error by repeatedly stipulating 
to fact that he had a prior conviction for possession. 
[9] Criminal Law 110 €=>1137(2) 
110 Criminal Law 
110XXIV Review 
HOXXIV(L) Scope of Review in General 
llOkl 135 Parties Entitled to Allege Error 
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llOkl 137 Estoppel 
llOkl 137(2) k. EiTor Committed or 
Invited by Party Complaining in General. Most 
Cited Cases 
On appeal, a party cannot take advantage of an error 
corrrmitted at trial when that party led the trial court 
into committing the error. 
[10] Criminal Law 110 €==>641.13(7) 
110 Criminal Law 
110XX Trial 
HOXX(B) Course and Conduct of Trial in 
General 
110k641 Counsel for Accused 
110k641.13 Adequacy of 
Representation 
110k641.13(2) Particular Cases and 
Problems 
110k641.13(7) k. Post-Trial 
Procedure and Review. Most Cited Cases 
Even if defense counsel was deficient in counseling 
defendant to stipulate to his prior conviction for 
drug possession, defendant was not prejudiced 
thereby, as parties agreed that error in prior 
conviction judgment was simply clerical, and, thus, 
prior judgment was still final and effective for 
purposes of enhancing defendant's sentence on his 
drug convictions. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6. 
[11] Criminal Law 110 €=>996(1) 
110 Criminal Law 
HOXXffl Judgment 
110k996 Amendment or Correction 
110k996(l) k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
A clerical error, once determined, can be amended 
and made effective as of a prior date so that the 
record accurately reflects that which took place. 
*1161 K. Andrew Fitzgerald, Moab, for Appellant. 
Mark L. Shurtleff, Attorney General and J. Frederic 
Voros Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellee. 
Before Judges BENCH, GREENWOOD, and 
BILLINGS. 
OPINION 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
Tf 1 Defendant Franklin Eric Halls appeals from his 
convictions of one count of unlawful possession of 
a controlled substance, see Utah Code Ann. § 
58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp.2005); one count of 
unlawful possession of an imitation controlled 
substance, see Utah Code Ann. § 58-37b-4 (2002); 
and one count of possession of paraphernalia, see 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (2002). We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
\ 2 On March 1, 2004, Officer Jim Eberling of the 
Monticello Police Department and Agent Travis 
Clark, a parole officer from the Department of 
Corrections, Adult Probation and Parole, went to 
Defendant's parents' house to speak to Defendant 
about a possible hit-and-run accident. Upon 
arriving, they discovered that Defendant was not 
home and decided to wait for him to return from 
work. Shortly thereafter, Defendant arrived at his 
parents' home in a pickup truck driven by Jim 
Abrams. 
% 3 Approaching Defendant's parents' home, 
Abrams glanced over at Defendant and noticed him 
bending over. He testified that it looked as if 
Defendant was shoving something under the seat. 
Abrams dropped off Defendant and left. 
^ 4 When Abrams arrived at his own home, he 
checked under the seat and found a black box 
containing some bags and scales. Upset that 
Defendant would hide paraphernalia in *1162 his 
truck, Abrams took the items he found to the police 
station and gave them to Police Chief Adair. 
If 5 Meanwhile, Officer Eberling and Agent Clark 
conducted a search of Defendant, his bedroom, and 
his vehicle. Agent Clark accompanied Officer 
Eberling to Defendant's residence because Agent 
Clark had been having some problems with 
Defendant and because Defendant had recently 
tested positive for methamphetamine. After 
searching Defendant's bedroom and truck, Officer 
Eberling and Agent Clark took Defendant to the 
police station to question him regarding the 
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hit-and-run accident and to possibly administer a 
urinalysis drug test. 
f 6 As they arrived at the police station, Chief 
Adair was across the street searching Abrams's 
truck. Officer Eberling and Agent Clark took 
Defendant into the station for questioning. During 
questioning, Chief Adair knocked on the door and 
handed Officer Eberling the items found under the 
seat in Abrams's truck. Those items included a bag 
containing a white crystal substance, a black box 
containing a set of scales and a couple of small 
plastic bags, and a larger empty bag. Chief Adair 
explained to Officer Eberling how Abrams found 
these items. 
% 7 Officer Eberling and Agent Clark then began 
to question Defendant regarding the items. 
Defendant first denied that the items belonged to 
him, but he eventually admitted that the items were 
his. Defendant told Officer Eberling and Agent 
Clark that the white crystal substance was his and 
that it was not methamphetamine, but a cutting 
agent called "MSM." Defendant stated that he was 
planning to mix the cutting agent into an ounce of 
methamphetamine so that he could use one ounce 
for free and sell the other. Defendant also stated 
that the scales were used to weigh the 
methamphetamine he sold and admitted that two of 
the small plastic bags had contained 
methamphetamine. Subsequent testing confirmed 
that the white crystal substance was not 
methamphetamine; the small plastic bags and 
scales tested positive for methamphetamine. 
f 8 At trial, Defendant testified that he did not 
know anything about the items found in Abrams's 
truck and denied owning them. Defendant stated 
that on the day he was questioned about the items 
found in Abrams's truck, he believed the police had 
pulled Abrams over, searched his truck, and found 
the contraband. Because Officer Eberling and 
Agent Clark told Defendant that he was already in 
trouble for violating his parole, he decided to admit 
ownership of the contraband to protect Abrams 
from any potential punishment. 
If 9 The jury found Defendant guilty of possession 
of a controlled substance, possession of an imitation 
© 2006 ThomsonAVest. No 
controlled substance, and possession of drug 
paraphernalia. After his conviction, Defendant 
stipulated to a prior conviction of possession of a 
controlled substance for puiposes of enhancement, 
even though Defendant's prior judgment read that 
he was convicted of possession with intent to 
distribute. The trial court indicated that there was a 
clerical error in the prior judgment, but that 
Defendant clearly had the prior conviction to 
enhance Defendant's current conviction to a second 
degree felony, resulting in a one- to fifteen-year 
sentence. Defendant appeals. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
[1][2] Tf 10 On appeal, Defendant asserts that the 
reasonable doubt jury instruction given at trial 
incorrectly stated the law and violated his due 
process rights. "Whether [a jury] instruction 
correctly states the law is reviewable under a 
correction of error standard, with no particular 
deference given to the trial court's ruling." State v. 
Archuleta, 850 P.2d 1232, 1244 (Utah 1993). 
However, rule 19(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure provides, in pertinent part: "Unless a 
party objects to an instruction or the failure to give 
an instruction, the instruction may not be assigned 
as error except to avoid a manifest injustice." Utah 
R.Crim. P. 19(e). Defendant admits that he never 
objected to the reasonable doubt jury instruction at 
trial. Therefore, pursuant to rule 19(e), Defendant's 
failure to object to the reasonable doubt jury 
instruction at trial renders the instruction " 
reviewable for plain error, or manifest injustice, 
rather than for correctness." * 1163State v. Cruz, 
2005 UT 45,i[ 16, 122 P.3d 543; see also State v. 
Casey, 2003 UT 55,K 40, 82 P.3d 1106 ("[I]n most 
circumstances [,] the term manifest injustice is 
synonymous with the plain error standard ...." 
(quotations and citation omitted)). 
[3] f^ 11 Defendant also asserts that the trial court 
erred when it enhanced Defendant's sentence based 
on the parties' stipulation that Defendant had a prior 
conviction for possession, because Defendant's 
prior judgment incorrectly stated that the prior 
conviction was for possession with the intent to 
distribute. According to Defendant, since the prior 
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judgment is not correct, it cannot be a final 
judgment for the purposes of enhancement. 
However, because Defendant invited the error, 
which he now appeals, we will not review it. We 
will not review "an error committed at trial when 
[Defendant] led the trial court into committing the 
error." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 
1993). 
ANALYSIS 
I. Defendant's Reasonable Doubt Jury Instruction 
f^ 12 Defendant asserts that the reasonable doubt 
jury instruction given at his trial incorrectly stated 
the law and violated the Due Process Clause of the 
United States Constitution. At Defendant's trial, 
the reasonable doubt instruction was in compliance 
with State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1997) 
, overruled in relevant part by State v. Reyes, 2005 
UT 33, 116 P.3d 305. It instructed the jury that " 
[t]he State must eliminate all reasonable doubt." 
However, after Defendant's trial, the Utah Supreme 
Court expressly abandoned the "obviate all 
reasonable doubt" requirement of the Robertson 
test. State v. Reyes, 2005 UT 33,f 30, 116 P.3d 
305. Relying on Reyes, see id., Defendant now 
asserts that under the new standard, the reasonable 
doubt jury instruction given at trial violated his due 
process rights. 
[4] TI 13 Rule 19(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure provides, in pertinent part: "Unless a 
party objects to an instruction or the failure to give 
an instruction, the instruction may not be assigned 
as error except to avoid a manifest injustice." Utah 
R.Crim. P. 19(e). Because Defendant admits that 
he did not object to the reasonable doubt jury 
instruction at trial, "we will only remand for a new 
trial if the error ... constitutes a 'manifest injustice.' 
" ™ Casey, 2003 UT 55 at \ 39, 82 P.3d 1106. 
FN1. Based on the invited error doctrine, 
the Utah Supreme Court has stated that "if 
counsel, either by statement or act, 
affirmatively represented to the court that 
he or she had no objection to the jury 
instruction, we will not review the 
instruction under the manifest injustice 
exception." State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 
22,f 54, 70 P.3d 111. In this case, 
defense counsel not only failed to object to 
the reasonable doubt jury instruction, but 
also expressly agreed to the reasonable 
doubt jury instruction. Utah law has not 
addressed whether the invited error 
doctrine applies when there has been a 
change of settled law. However, federal 
law states that "[w]here a defendant 
submits proposed jury instructions in 
reliance on current law, and on direct 
appeal that law is declared constitutionally 
infirm, we will not apply the invited error 
doctrine. Instead, we will review for plain 
error." United States v. West Indies 
Tramp., Inc., 127 R3d 299, 305 (3d 
Cir.1997). Because we similarly 
acknowledge an exception to the 
preservation rule for exceptional 
circumstances "where a change in law or 
the settled interpretation of law colored the 
failure to have raised an issue at trial," 
State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 10 (Utah 
Ct.App.1996), we do not apply the invited 
error doctrine here. 
[5] % 14 "[M]anifest injustice" has been defined as 
being "synonymous with the 'plain error' standard." 
Id. at K 40. The manifest injustice or the plain 
error standard requires the appellant to show that " ' 
(i) [a]n error exists; (li) the error should have been 
obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is 
harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the 
appellant, or phrased differently, our confidence in 
the verdict is undermined.' " Id. at f 41 (quoting 
State v. Powell, £72 P.2d 1027, 1031 (Utah 1994)). 
It is under this plain error standard that we review 
Defendant's appeal of the reasonable doubt jury 
instruction given at his trial. 
^ 15 Under the first prong of the plain error 
standard, Defendant must show that "[a]n error 
exists." Id. Defendant asserts that the error in the 
reasonable doubt jury instruction given at trial is the 
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use of the phrase "eliminate all reasonable doubt." 
In *1164 Reyes, the Utah Supreme Court expressly 
abandoned the phrase "obviate all reasonable doubt" 
as a requirement for a reasonable doubt jury 
instruction. 2005 UT 33 at ^ 30, 116 P.3d 305. 
For the purposes of this appeal, the parties do not 
dispute that "obviate all reasonable doubt" and " 
eliminate all reasonable doubt" are similar. 
However, we consider the "eliminate all reasonable 
doubt" jury instruction to be less troublesome than 
the Reyes "obviate all reasonable doubt" instruction. 
[6] t 16 In State v. Cmz, 2005 UT 45, 122 P.3d 
543, the Utah Supreme Court determined that Reyes 
effectively overruled the Robertson test for 
reasonable doubt jury instructions and adopted the 
test enunciated by the United States Supreme Court 
in Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 22, 114 S.Ct. 
1239, 127 L.Ed.2d 583 (1994). See Cruz, 2005 
UT 45 at If 21, 122 P.3d 543. The Victor test 
provides: 
[S]o long as the court instructs the jury on the 
necessity that the defendant's guilt be proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt, the Constitution does 
not require that any particular form of words be 
used in advising the jury of the government's burden 
of proof. Rather, "taken as a whole, the 
instructions [must] correctly convey the concept of 
reasonable doubt to the jury." 
Victor, 511 U.S. at 5, 114 S.Ct. 1239 (second 
alteration in original) (citations omitted). This 
overarching principle, that "taken as a whole, [the 
reasonable doubt jury instruction must] correctly 
communicate the principle of reasonable doubt" to 
the jury, is now the standard for "assessing the 
validity of reasonable doubt instructions." Cruz, 
2005 UT 45 at U 21, 122 P.3d 543. Therefore, if 
Defendant's reasonable doubt jury instruction, " * 
taken as a whole, ... correctly convey[ed] the 
concept of reasonable doubt to the jury,' " id at ^ 
20 (quoting Victor, 511 U.S. at 22, 114 S.Ct. 1239), 
then it was not erroneous. We conclude that 
Defendant's jury instruction was not in error. 
Tf 17 The Reyes court found the "obviate all 
reasonable doubt" concept "linguistically opaque 
and conceptually suspect." 2005 UT 33,^ f 26, 116 
P.3d 305. The potential problem with the "obviate 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No 
all reasonable doubt" requirement is that it 
contemplates a two-step undertaking: the 
identification of the doubt and a testing of the 
validity of the doubt against the evidence.... The " 
beyond a reasonable doubt" standard does not, 
however, condition a conclusion that a doubt is 
reasonable on an ability either to articulate the 
doubt or to state a reason for it. 
Id. at U 27. Therefore, "ftjo the extent that the 
Robertson 'obviate' test would permit the State to 
argue that it need only obviate doubts that are 
sufficiently defined, the test works to improperly 
diminish the State's burden." Id. at f^ 28 (emphasis 
added). Essentially, the obviate test's "substantial 
risk of causing a juror to find guilt based on a 
degree of proof below beyond a reasonable doubt," 
id. at % 30, comes from its potential to allow the 
State to argue that a juror must articulate and 
obviate specific doubts. 
1 18 This is not the situation here. The trial 
court's jury instruction stated: 
A defendant is presumed innocent until proven 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. This 
presumption follows the defendant throughout the 
trial. If a defendant's guilt is not shown beyond a 
reasonable doubt, the defendant should be acquitted. 
The [S]tate must eliminate all reasonable doubt. 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not proof to an 
absolute certainty. Reasonable doubt is a doubt 
based on reason, which is reasonable in view of all 
the evidence. Reasonable doubt is not a doubt 
based on fancy, imagination, or wholly speculative 
possibility. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is 
enough proof to satisfy the mind, or convince the 
understanding of those bound to act 
conscientiously, and enough to eliminate reasonable 
doubt. A reasonable doubt is a doubt that 
reasonable people would entertain based upon the 
evidence in the case. 
[7] If 19 This reasonable doubt jury instruction 
given at Defendant's trial did not convey the 
message that the State must only eliminate those 
doubts that are sufficiently defined; neither did the 
State argue that the juror need articulate and 
eliminate specific doubts. Instead, the jury 
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instruction, "taken as a whole, correctly 
communicate[d] the principle of reasonable doubt" 
to the jury. Cruz, 2005 UT 45 at % 21, 122 P.3d 
543. 
*1165 f 20 Although the language "obviate all 
reasonable doubt" has been abandoned by Reyes, see 
2005 UT 33 at U 34, 116 P.3d 305, we are not 
persuaded that the use of "eliminate all reasonable 
doubt" in Defendant's jury instruction constitutes 
manifest injustice because the reasonable doubt jury 
instruction "correctly communicate[d] the principle 
of reasonable doubt" to the jury. State v. Cruz, 
2005 UT 45,H 21, 122 P.3d 543.FN2 Therefore, 
we do not remand for a new trial. 
FN2. In State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45, 122 
P.3d 543, the Utah Supreme Court 
reviewed reasonable doubt jury 
instructions that included the phrase " 
dispel all reasonable doubt" and found that 
those instructions were not erroneous. Id. 
at ffi[ 11, 18. Because "dispel all 
reasonable doubt" and "eliminate all 
reasonable doubt" are functionally 
equivalent, Defendant's reasonable doubt 
jury instruction is not erroneous. 
IL Defendant's Sentence Enhancement 
Tf 21 Defendant also claims that the trial court 
erred when it enhanced his sentence based on a 
prior conviction of possession of a controlled 
substance, even though Defendant stipulated to the 
prior conviction. Essentially, Defendant argues 
that because the judgment from his first conviction 
for possession incorrectly stated that he pleaded 
guilty to possession with intent to distribute, when 
he actually only pleaded to simple possession, the 
judgment is ineffectual. 
[8][9] K 22 Defendant repeatedly stipulated to the 
fact that he had a prior conviction for possession, 
thereby inviting the error he now appeals. "[0]n 
appeal, a party cannot take advantage of an error 
committed at trial when that party led the trial court 
into committing the error." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 
1201, 1220 (Utah 1993). After jury selection, 
counsel for Defendant told the trial court that if the 
jury found Defendant guilty, Defendant would 
stipulate to a prior conviction for possession. 
Defense counsel also explained that the prior 
judgment contained a clerical error, but that 
Defendant was still willing to stipulate to the prior 
conviction. Moreover, after Defendant was found 
guilty, Defendant again stipulated to the prior 
conviction for possession. When the trial court 
asked if there was "[a]ny legal reason why sentence 
should not be pronounced," counsel for Defendant 
replied, "None, your honor." 
[10] [11] 1f 23 Clearly, Defendant invited the 
alleged error he now appeals by repeatedly 
stipulating to the fact that he had a prior conviction 
for possession. The rationale behind this 
stipulation is clear: regardless of whether the prior 
conviction was for simple possession or possession 
with intent to distribute, the prior conviction 
enhanced the Defendant's sentence. Therefore, 
because Defendant invited the error he now appeals, 
we will not review it.FN3 
FN3. In the alternative, Defendant argues 
that his counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance because he counseled Defendant 
to stipulate to the prior conviction. 
However, even if we were to find defense 
counsel's assistance defective for this 
reason, Defendant cannot prove that "but 
for counsel's deficient performancef,] there 
is a reasonable probability that the 
outcome ... would have been different." 
Wickham v. Galetka, 2002 UT 72,f 19, 
61 P.3d 978 (quotations and citation 
omitted). Rule 30(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure states that "[clerical 
mistakes in judgments ... may be corrected 
by the court at any time and after such 
notice, if any, as the court may order." 
Utah R.Crim. P. 30(b) (emphasis added). 
Moreover, a clerical error, once 
determined, can be amended and made " 
effective as of a prior date so that the 
record accurately reflects that which took 
place." Preece v. Preece, 682 P.2d 298, 
299 (Utah 1984). Because both the trial 
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court and the parties agreed that the error 
in the prior judgment was simply clerical, 
the prior judgment would still be final and 
effective for the purposes of enhancing 
Defendant's sentence. 
CONCLUSION 
^ 24 The reasonable doubt jury instruction given at 
Defendant's trial is not manifestly unjust because it 
correctly conveyed the concept of reasonable doubt 
to the jury. Further, because Defendant invited the 
error, we decline to address Defendant's claim that 
his sentence enhancement is somehow erroneous 
because of a clerical error in Defendant's prior 
judgment. 
K 25 WE CONCUR: RUSSELL W. BENCH, 
Presiding Judge PAMELA T. GREENWOOD, 
Associate Presiding Judge. 
UtahApp.,2006. 
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BILLINGS. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official 
Publication) 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
*1 Defendant Devon Kinner appeals his convictions 
for one count each of receiving or transferring a 
stolen motor vehicle, a second degree felony, see 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1316 (2005); possession 
of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, see 
id. § 58-37a-5(l) (2002); burglary, a second degree 
felony, see id. § 76-6-202 (2003); and theft, a 
second degree felony, see id. §§ 76-6-412, -404 
(2003). We affirm. 
First, Defendant argues that the trial court's 
reasonable doubt jury instruction incorrectly stated 
the law and thus violated his due process rights. At 
Defendant's trial, the court's reasonable doubt jury 
instruction complied with State v. Robertson, 932 
P.2d 1219 (Utah 1997), overruled in relevant part 
by State v. Reyes, 2005 UT 33, 116 P.3d 305. The 
instruction informed the jury that "[t]he State must 
eliminate all reasonable doubt." However, 
following Defendant's conviction, the Utah 
Supreme Court expressly abandoned the "obviate 
all reasonable doubt" requirement of the Robertson 
test. See Reyes, 2005 UT 33 at % 30 (quotations 
omitted). 
Although the phrases "obviate all reasonable doubt" 
and "eliminate all reasonable doubt" are similar, we 
conclude the language of the instruction in the 
present case was not fatal to the reasonable doubt 
instruction. In eliminating the "obviate all 
reasonable doubt" requirement, see id., the Utah 
Supreme Court essentially adopted the test 
enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in 
Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1 (1994). In Victor, 
the Court stated that reasonable doubt jury 
instructions are adequate if "taken as a whole, 
the[y] ... correctly convey the concept of reasonable 
doubt to the jury." 511 U.S. at 22. In State v. Cruz, 
2005 UT 45, 122 P.3d 543, and in State v. Halls, 
2006 UT App 142, jury instructions containing the 
phrases "dispel all reasonable doubt," Cruz, 2005 
UT 45 at TI 11, and "eliminate all reasonable doubt, 
" Halls, 2006 UT App 142 at H 12, were held to 
not constitute error. See Cruz, 2005 UT 45 at \ 22; 
Halls, 2006 UT App 142 at \ 20. Both instructions 
complied with the test enunciated in Victor, see 511 
U.S. at 22, and expressly adopted in Cruz, see 2005 
UT 45 at |^ 21, that a reasonable doubt jury 
instruction must "correctly communicate the 
principle of reasonable doubt" to the jury. Id.; Halls, 
2006 UT App 142 at % 20. In this case, as in Cruz 
and Halls, the reasonable doubt jury instruction " 
correctly communicate [d] the principle of 
reasonable doubt" to the jury. Cruz, 2005 UT 45 at 
H 21; Halls, 2006 UT App 142 at ^ 20. 
Defendant also argues he was denied effective 
assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to file 
a motion for a directed verdict following the denial 
of his motion to dismiss. To demonstrate ineffective 
assistance of counsel, "the defendant must show 
that counsel's performance was deficient" and "that 
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the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant." 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) 
*2 Defendant argues that although his counsel 
moved to dismiss the counts charged against him, 
his counsel's performance was deficient when she 
failed to also move for a directed verdict because 
Utah appellate courts have imposed different 
standards for granting motions for directed verdicts 
than for granting motions to dismiss. We disagree. 
"If the State fails to produce 'believable evidence 
of all the elements of the crime charged,' the trial 
court must dismiss the charges." State v. Hamilton, 
2003 UT 22,K 40, 70 P.3d 111 (quoting State v. 
Clark, 2001 UT 9,H 13, 20 P.3d 300). Believable 
evidence is evidence that is "capable of supporting 
a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 
1(41 (quotations and citation omitted). 
In a motion for a directed verdict at the end of the 
State's case, the trial court must decide if "the State . 
.. established] a prima facie case against the 
defendant by producing 'believable evidence of all 
the elements of the crime charged." ' Clark, 2001 
UT 9 at H 13 (quoting State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 
781, 784 (Utah 1992)). 
In the present case, the trial judge denied a motion 
to dismiss at the close of the State's case. 
Accordingly, the trial court found there was 
believable evidence for each element of the crimes 
charged "capable of supporting a finding of guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt ." Hamilton, 2003 UT 
22 at % 41 (quotations and citation omitted). 
Therefore, a motion for a directed verdict would 
have been futile because if the trial court believed 
there was evidence capable of supporting a verdict 
of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the trial court 
would also find the jury capable of finding 
Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Defendant argues that, even if the court finds that 
the motion to dismiss could be construed as 
functionally equivalent to a motion for a directed 
verdict, the motion was deficient in its content when 
it failed to argue that there was no reliable evidence 
tying Defendant to the crime. However, the State 
presented a witness whose testimony directly tied 
Defendant to the crimes charged. The outcome of 
this case hinged largely on the credibility given to 
the State's key witness. Determinations of witness 
credibility are the exclusive province of the jury. See 
State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993). 
Therefore, Defendant has not shown that the failure 
to argue this issue constitutes ineffective assistance 
of counsel. 
We affirm. 
WE CONCUR: RUSSELL W. BENCH, Presiding 
Judge and PAMELA T. GREENWOOD, Associate 
Presiding Judge. 
Utah App.,2006. 
State v. Kinne 
Not Reported in P.3d, 2006 WL 1030328 (Utah 
App.), 2006 UT App 156 
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Before Judges BENCH, GREENWOOD, and 
DAVIS. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official 
Publication) 
BENCH, Presiding Judge: 
*1 Defendant Graham Woodruff Austin argues, 
under the standard set forth in State v. Reyes, 2005 
UT 33, 1f 30, 116 P.3d 305, that part of the 
reasonable doubt jury instruction-"[i]t is the burden 
of the State to eliminate all reasonable doubt" 
-violated his due process rights. Because Defendant 
did not object to the reasonable doubt jury 
instruction at trial, he asserts plain error on appeal. 
See State v. Halls, 2006 UT App 142, ffi| 13-14. " 
Under the first prong of the plain error standard, 
Defendant must show that '[a]n error exists." ' Id. 
at Tf 15 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). " 
[I]f Defendant's reasonable doubt jury instruction, 
taken as a whole, ... correctly convey[ed] the 
concept of reasonable doubt to the jury, then it was 
not erroneous." Id. at f^ 16 (omission and second 
alteration in original) (quotations and citations 
omitted). 
In the instant matter, the "reasonable doubt jury 
instruction given at Defendant's trial did not convey 
the message that the State must only eliminate those 
doubts that are sufficiently defined; neither did the 
State argue that the juror need articulate and 
eliminate specific doubts." Id. at % 19. As we held 
in Halls, "we are not persuaded that the use of ' 
eliminate all reasonable doubt" ' constitutes plain 
error. Id. at % 20. We conclude that the jury 
instruction, "taken as a whole, correctly 
communicate[d] the principle of reasonable doubt." 
State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45, H 21, 122 P.3d 543. 
Defendant also asserts that the trial court erred by 
(1) imposing consecutive sentences without the 
benefit of a presentence investigation report (PSI) 
and (2) failing to adequately consider Defendant's 
history, remorse, and rehabilitative needs in 
violation of Utah Code section 76-3-401(2), see 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2) (2003). 
"Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court 
may, with the concurrence of the defendant, 
continue the date for the imposition of sentence ... 
for the purpose of obtaining a[PSI] ... or 
information from other sources about the defendant. 
" Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(5)(a) (Supp.2005) 
(emphasis added). FN1 This statute gives the trial 
court discretion to impose a sentence without 
ordering a PSI. See State v. Madsen, 2002 UT App 
345, ffi[ 13-15, 57 P.3d 1134. Additionally, 
Defendant specifically requested that the trial court " 
waive his time for sentencing and be sentenced 
today," knowing that no PSI would be completed. 
The trial court granted Defendant's request and 
sentenced him immediately after the trial concluded. 
Therefore, the trial court did not err in sentencing 
Defendant without the benefit of a PSI. 
FN1. There have been no relevant 
amendments to the applicable statutes 
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crimes in this matter. For convenience, we 
therefore cite to the most recent version of 
the statutes. 
Further, in determining whether to impose 
consecutive sentences, the trial court is required to " 
consider the gravity and circumstances of the 
offenses, the number of victims, and the history, 
character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2). Defendant asserts 
that the trial court was unable to sufficiently 
consider "his histoiy, his remorse, and his 
rehabilitative needs," in large part because a PSI 
had not been completed. 
*2 "Although the trial court did not explicitly 
address the enumerated factors in section 
[76-3-401(2) ], there is ample evidence in the 
record that the court considered these factors at the 
time of Defendant's sentencing." State v. 
Valdovinos, 2003 UT App 432, fl 30, 82 P.3d 1167 
. The trial court here received evidence concerning 
Defendant's drug addiction, the recent 
hospitalization of his mother, his failing marriage, 
his recent unemployment, and his car braking down. 
The trial court also received evidence concerning 
Defendant's immediate remorse, his apology to the 
victim's family at trial, and the victim impact 
statements. As a result, we hold that the trial court 
sufficiently considered all of the sentencing factors 
and did not abuse its discretion by imposing 
consecutive sentences. Furthermore, Defendant's 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is without 
merit because counsel was not "objectively deficient 
" in not objecting to the lack of a PSI and to the 
imposition of consecutive sentences. State v. 
Mecham, 2000 UT App 247, H 21, 9 P.3d 777. 
Accordingly, we affirm. 
WE CONCUR: PAMELA T. GREENWOOD, 
Associate Presiding Judge and JAMES Z. DAVIS, 
Judge. 
UtahApp.,2006. 
State v. Austin 
Not Reported in P.3d, 2006 WL 1174241 (Utah 
App.), 2006 UT App 184 
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State v. ReyesUtah,2005. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff, Petitioner, and 
Cross-Respondent, 
v. 
German Cruz REYES, Defendant, Respondent, and 
Cross-Petitioner. 
No. 20040078. 
June 7, 2005. 
Background: Defendant was convicted in the 
Third District Court, Salt Lake Department, 
William Barrett, J., of aggravated sexual assault. 
Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals, 84 P.3d 
841, reversed and remanded. 
Holdings: On grant of both parties petition for 
certiorari, the Supreme Court, Nehring, J., held that: 
(1) a jury is not required to be instructed that to 
return a guilty verdict, it must obviate all reasonable 
doubts; 
(2) trial court's instruction on reasonable doubt, 
which stated that reasonable doubt is "not doubt 
which is merely possible," appropriately addressed 
concept of "possibility" in gauging reasonableness 
of doubt; 
(3) State courts are authorized to instruct regarding 
reasonable doubt by giving Federal Judicial Center 
instruction, stating that proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt is proof that leaves jurors firmly convinced of 
defendant's guilt, and that the law does not require 
proof that overcomes every doubt; and 
(4) trial judge's decision to recite jury instructions 
prior to trial and not repeat such instructions at the 
close of evidence complied with rule requiring court 
to instruct jury at close of evidence, and rule 
governing giving of jury instructions. 
Decision of Court of Appeals affirmed in part and 
reversed in part. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Criminal Law 110 €=ni34(7) 
110 Criminal Law 
110XXIV Review 
110XXIV(L) Scope of Review in General 
1 lOkl 134 Scope and Extent in General 
110k! 134(7) k. Extent of Review as 
Determined by Mode Thereof. Most Cited Cases 
On certiorari, Supreme Court reviews the decision 
of the Court of Appeals for correctness, giving its 
conclusions of law no deference. 
[2] Criminal Law 110 €=>561(1) 
110 Criminal Law 
110XVII Evidence 
HOXVII(V) Weight and Sufficiency 
110k561 Reasonable Doubt 
110k561(l) k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
No person accused may be convicted of a crime 
unless each element of the offense has been proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
[3] Criminal Law 110 €=^789(4) 
110 Criminal Law 
110XX Trial 
110XX(G) Instructions: Necessity, 
Requisites, and Sufficiency 
110k789 Reasonable Doubt 
110k789(4) k. Sufficiency of 
Instructions as to Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt. 
Most Cited Cases 
A jury is not required to be instructed that to return 
a guilty verdict, it must obviate all reasonable 
doubts. 
[4] Criminal Law 110 €^>789(2) 
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110 Criminal Law 
110XX Trial 
HOXX(G) Instructions: Necessity, 
Requisites, and Sufficiency 
110k789 Reasonable Doubt 
110k789(2) k. Sufficiency of 
Definitions of Reasonable Doubt in General. Most 
Cited Cases 
Trial court's instruction on reasonable doubt, which 
stated that reasonable doubt is "not doubt which is 
merely possible," appropriately addressed concept 
of "possibility" in gauging the reasonableness of 
doubt; instruction was followed by the explanatory 
phrase "since everything in human affairs is open to 
some possible or imaginary doubt," and such 
language effectively neutralized the risk that the 
reference to a "mere possibility" would have 
improperly led a juror to apply a standard of proof 
lesser than beyond a reasonable doubt. 
[5] Criminal Law 110 €=^789(4) 
110 Criminal Law 
110XX Trial 
110XX(G) Instructions: Necessity, 
Requisites, and Sufficiency 
110k789 Reasonable Doubt 
110k789(4) k. Sufficiency of 
Instructions as to Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt. 
Most Cited Cases 
State courts are authorized to instruct regarding 
reasonable doubt by giving Federal Judicial Center 
instruction, stating that proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt is proof that leaves you firmly convinced of 
the defendant's guilt, that there are very few things 
in this world that we know with absolute certainty 
and in criminal cases the law does not require proof 
that overcomes every possible doubt, that juror 
must find defendant guilty if juror is firmly 
convinced that the defendant is guilty of the crime 
charged, and that juror must give defendant the 
benefit of the doubt if juror thinks that there is real 
possibility that defendant is not guilty. 
[6] Criminal Law 110 ^ 8 0 1 
110 Criminal Law 
110XX Trial 
110XX(G) Instructions: Necessity, 
Requisites, and Sufficiency 
110k801 k. Time for Giving Instructions. 
Most Cited Cases 
Criminal Law 110 €^>806(1) 
110 Criminal Law 
110XX Trial 
HOXX(G) Instructions: Necessity, 
Requisites, and Sufficiency 
110k806 Repetition 
110k806(l) k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Trial judge's decision to recite jury instructions 
prior to trial and not repeat such instructions at the 
close of evidence complied with rule requiring court 
to instruct jury at close of evidence, and rule 
governing giving of jury instructions; rule requiring 
trial court to instruct jury at close of evidence did 
not demand repetition of even "vital rights" 
instructions in cases of short duration, of which 
defendant's case was, as less than 24 hours 
separated trial court's reading of the preliminary 
instructions from the conclusion of evidence, and 
jury had been provided with a written copy of every 
instruction. Rules Crim.Proc, Rules 17(g)(6), 19. 
*306 Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., J. Frederic 
Voros, Jr., Asst. Att'y Gen., Michael E. Postma, Salt 
Lake City, for petitioner. 
Kent R. Hart, Lisa J. Remal, Salt Lake City, for 
respondent. 
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals 
NEHRING, Justice: 
INTRODUCTION 
U 1 We granted certiorari to review the court of 
appeals's ruling that the reasonable doubt 
instruction used in the trial of German Cruz Reyes 
was improper because it did not specifically 
conform to the three-part reasonable doubt 
instruction upheld by this court in State v. 
Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1997), overruled 
on other grounds by State v. Weeks, 2002 UT 98, % 
25 n. 11, 61 P.3d 1000. The State asks us to 
overrule Robertson. We also agreed to take up Mr. 
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Reyes's cross-petition, which challenges the court of 
appeals's deteimination that the trial court's refusal 
to reread preliminary jury instructions at the close 
of evidence was harmless error. Because we share 
the court of appeals's misgivings about the wisdom 
of Robertson, we reverse the court of appeals's *307 
holding on the reasonable doubt instruction and 
announce a "safe harbor" reasonable doubt 
instruction. We also affirm, on other grounds, the 
court of appeals's decision on the timing of the jury 
instructions. 
BACKGROUND 
FN1. For a complete recitation of the facts, 
see State v. Reyes, 2004 UT App 8, ffij 
2-13,84P.3d841. 
\ 2 In 2002, the State charged Mr. Reyes with 
aggravated assault. Before the trial began, the 
court proposed reading the eighteen preliminary 
instructions, including instructions on the 
presumption of innocence and the definition of 
reasonable doubt. Mr. Reyes objected to an initial 
reading of the instructions unless the court reread 
the instructions at the end of the trial, arguing that a 
failure to recite the instructions at the close of the 
evidence would violate his due process rights and 
Utah law. Mr. Reyes also objected to the content 
of the trial court's reasonable doubt instruction. 
The instruction read: 
All presumptions of law, independent of evidence, 
are in favor of innocence. A defendant is presumed 
innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Where you are satisfied that a reasonable 
doubt exists as to a defendant's guilt, he/she is 
entitled to acquittal. 
The burden is upon the prosecution to prove the 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt does not require proof to 
an absolute certainty. Reasonable doubt is 
required, not doubt which is merely possible, since 
everything in human affairs is open to some 
possible or imaginary doubt. Proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt is a degree of proof that satisfies 
your mind and convinces your conscientious 
understanding. Reasonable doubt is doubt 
entertained by reasonable men and women and 
arises from the evidence, or lack of evidence, in the 
case. 
\ 3 Mr. Reyes asserted this instruction was 
improper because it did not pass the three-part 
content test announced in State v. Robertson, 932 
P.2d 1219 (Utah 1997), overruled on other grounds 
by State v. Weeks, 2002 UT 98, ] 25 n. 11, 61 P.3d 
1000. Mr. Reyes cited first, the instruction's failure 
to comply with Robertson's mandate that a 
reasonable doubt instruction "specifically state that 
the State's proof must obviate all reasonable doubt" 
and, second, its improper inclusion of the phrase " 
doubt which is merely possible," id. at 1232. 
1f 4 The trial court turned away both of Mr. Reyes's 
objections. At the conclusion of opening 
statements, the court read the eighteen preliminary 
jury instructions and provided each juror with a 
written copy of them. The next day, before closing 
arguments, the court read fourteen additional 
instructions and again provided each juror a written 
copy of the instructions. The jury found Mr. Reyes 
guilty on both counts, and the court sentenced him 
to two concurrent terms of fifteen years to life. Mr. 
Reyes appealed. 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS REVIEWS REYES 
AND REASONABLE DOUBT 
% 5 Mr. Reyes took two issues to the court of 
appeals. State v. Reyes, 2004 UT App 8, H 1, 84 
P.3d 841. First, he repeated his claim that the trial 
court violated his "due process and jury trial rights" 
under the United States Constitution because the 
trial court's reasonable doubt instruction did not 
utilize the specific language from Robertson 
requiring the State to "obviate all reasonable doubt" 
and "erroneously stated that reasonable doubt is ... 
not doubt which is merely possible." Id. at f^ 16. 
Second, Mr. Reyes argued that when the trial court 
refused to reread the eighteen preliminary jury 
instructions at the close of evidence, it violated 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(g)(6) and 
therefore "his due process rights to a fair trial." Id. 
at ^ 23. 
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If 6 Mr. Reyes argued that the "beyond a 
reasonable doubt" jury instruction was defective 
because it failed to comport with the Robertson test. 
Id. at H 16. The court of appeals took up its 
analysis of Mr. Reyes's challenge not with 
Robertson, but with the United States Supreme 
Court's most recent pronouncement on reasonable 
doubt in Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 114 S.Ct. 
1239, 127 L.Ed.2d 583 (1994). In Victor, the 
Supreme Court held: 
*308 The beyond a reasonable doubt standard is a 
requirement of due process, but the Constitution 
neither prohibits trial courts from defining 
reasonable doubt nor requires them to do so as a 
matter of course. Indeed, so long as the court 
instructs the jury on the necessity that the 
defendant's guilt be proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt, ... the Constitution does not require that any 
particular form of words be used in advising the 
jury of the government's burden of proof. Rather, 
taken as a whole, the instructions [must] correctly 
convey the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury. 
Id. at 5, 114 S.Ct. 1239 (emphasis added) (citations 
omitted). 
% 1 The court of appeals contrasted the Supreme 
Court's guidance on reasonable doubt with ours in 
Robertson. Robertson, which has been our sole 
occasion to review a "beyond a reasonable doubt" 
instruction since the Supreme Court handed down 
Victor, did not acknowledge the existence of Victor. 
Instead, we ratified and applied a three-part 
evaluative model first suggested by Justice Stewart 
in his dissent in State v. Ireland, 113 P 2d 1375, 
1380-82 (Utah 1989) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
Robertson described the test as follows: 
First, "the instruction should specifically state that 
the State's proof must obviate all reasonable doubt." 
Second, the instruction should not state that a 
reasonable doubt is one which "would govern or 
control a person in the more weighty affairs of life," 
as such an instruction tends to trivialize the decision 
of whether to convict. Third, "it is inappropriate to 
instruct that a reasonable doubt is not merely a 
possibility," although it is permissible to instruct 
that a "fanciful or wholly speculative possibility 
ought not to defeat proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1232 (citations omitted). 
^ 8 The court of appeals hewed tightly to the 
Robertson test in assessing Mr. Reyes's challenge. 
It held that the reasonable doubt instruction given 
the jury in Mr. Reyes's trial failed the first and third 
Robertson elements, and it accordingly remanded 
for a new trial. Reyes, 2004 UT App 8 at fflf 
21-22, 84 P.3d 841. The court of appeals reached 
its holding reluctantly, agreeing with the State that 
the rigor of the Robertson test could not be 
reconciled with Victor's expansive approach to the 
content of reasonable doubt instructions. Id. at f^ 
21. 
H 9 The court of appeals also concluded that the 
trial court erred when it did not repeat the 
preliminary jury instructions at the close of 
evidence. Id. at ^ 24. The court read Utah Rule 
of Criminal Procedure 17(g)(6) to unambiguously 
require that the jury should be instructed " '[w]hen 
the evidence is concluded and at any other 
appropriate time.' " Id. (quoting Utah R.Crim. P. 
17(g)(6)). It interpreted this language to mandate a 
repetition of all instructions vital to the defendant's 
rights at the conclusion of evidence irrespective of 
when or how the court had previously delivered 
those instructions. However, the court of appeals 
held that this error was harmless because there was 
no likelihood that, had the trial court repeated the 
preliminary instructions at the close of evidence, the 
verdict would have been any different. Both 
parties petitioned for certiorari, which we granted. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[1] |^ 10 "On certiorari, we review the court of 
appeals'[s] decision for correctness, giving its 
conclusions of law no deference." State v. 
Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, If 7, 86 P.3d 742. 
ANALYSIS 
I. UTAH'S REASONABLE DOUBT 
INSTRUCTION 
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[2] If 11 No person accused in the United States 
may be convicted of a crime unless each element of 
the offense has been proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362, 90 S.Ct. 
1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). The Supreme Court 
has assigned this standard of proof constitutional 
status, linking it to both the Fifth Amendment right 
to due process of law and the Sixth Amendment 
right to a jury trial. *3Q9Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 
U.S. 275, 278, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 
(1993); Winship, 397 U.S. at 362, 364, 90 S.Ct. 
1068. The degree of certainty of guilt that we 
insist be held by those entrusted with judging the 
fate of persons charged with crimes before we will 
permit the State to wield its power to punish is not 
only a measure of evidence, but also in a more 
fundamental sense a gauge of our nations 
conscience. The measure of certainty the law 
demands before finding guilt reflects the balance we 
are willing to strike between ensuring that all of the 
guilty are brought to justice and preventing the 
conviction and punishment of the innocent. 
Blackstone set an enduring benchmark for the 
measure of certainty required to convict in a 
civilized society when he stated that "the law holds 
that it is better that ten guilty persons escape than 
that one innocent suffer." 4 William Blackstone, 
Commentaries *27, quoted in Coffin v. United 
States, 156 U.S. 432, 456, 15 S.Ct. 394, 39 L.Ed. 
481(1895). 
% 12 Although Blackstone expresses a moral ideal 
of justice which claims few detractors, his terse 
pronouncement on the State's burden of proof still 
leaves unanswered the question of what degree of 
satisfaction a juror must have with the quality and 
quantity of evidence before finding a defendant 
guilty. That we have settled on "beyond a 
reasonable doubt" as an answer does not fully 
relieve the unease courts have felt over the 
imprecision of this time-honored standard. The 
nagging sense that the law can and should "do better 
" than merely instruct jurors that they must find 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt accounts for a long 
quest to formulate a clearer, more concise, and 
more understandable reasonable doubt jury 
instruction. For the most part, the role of this 
court, like that of most appellate courts, has been as 
a critic of reasonable doubt instructions. In 
keeping with the responsibilities of an appellate 
court, our contributions to the attainment of an ideal 
"beyond a reasonable doubt" instruction have 
appeared in the form of periodic piecemeal 
pronouncements approving or rejecting words, 
phrases, or concepts that litigants have chosen to 
bring to us on appeal As the court of appeals's 
struggle with Robertson aptly confirms, this process 
has not produced a track record of steady or swift 
evolutionary progress. 
*| 13 The United States Supreme Court has 
followed an approach similar to ours. Although 
having granted the standard of "beyond a 
reasonable doubt" a constitutional pedigree, the 
Supreme Court has done little to provide direction 
for its integration into the day-to-day operation of 
the criminal justice system. As Victor v. Nebraska, 
511 U.S. 1, 114 S.Ct. 1239, 127 L.Ed.2d 583 (1994) 
, makes clear, the Court has instead elected to 
sanction great flexibility in the manner in which the 
concept of "beyond a reasonable doubt" is 
corhmunicated to juries. See id. at 5, 114 S.Ct. 
1239 ("So long as the court instructs the jury on the 
necessity that the defendant's guilt be proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt ... the Constitution does 
not require that any particular form of words be 
used in advising the jury of the government's burden 
of proof."). 
% 14 Because it provides useful context for our 
discussion of the "beyond a reasonable doubt" and 
sets out the standard of review that we apply in 
place of Robertson, we take a closer look at Victor. 
Victor came to the Supreme Court as a consolidated 
review of two challenges to the content of "beyond 
a reasonable doubt" jury instructions, one from 
California and one from Nebraska. Id. at 6, 114 
S.Ct. 1239. The Court affirmed the constitutionality 
of both instructions. Id. The majority was 
persuaded that, when the instructions were 
considered as a whole, there was not a reasonable 
likelihood that the jury applied the instructions in a 
manner resulting in a fmding of guilt based on a 
lesser standard than beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. 
at 14-17, 21-22, 114 S.Ct. 1239. 
% 15 The Supreme Court had previously extended 
to the states its declaration that the "beyond a 
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reasonable doubt" standard is a necessary element 
of federal due process. Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 278, 
113 S.Ct. 2078. Still, citing its lack of supervisory 
authority over state courts, the Victor Court stopped 
short of announcing a definitive reasonable doubt 
instruction for use in state courts. 511 U.S. at 6, 
114 S.Ct. 1239. Rather, it reiterated that the 
demands of due process are met when, " 'taken as a 
whole, the instructions correctly conve[y] the 
concept of reasonable *310 doubt to the jury.' " Id. 
(quoting Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 
140, 75 S.Ct. 127, 99 L.Ed. 150 (1954)). The 
concept of reasonable doubt can be communicated 
in many ways as "the Constitution neither prohibits 
trial courts from defining reasonable doubt nor 
requires them to do so as a matter of course." Id. at 
5, 114 S.Ct. 1239 (citations omitted). 
A. The State's Challenge to the Reasonable Doubt 
Instruction 
% 16 According to the State, this court has lost 
touch with the reasonable doubt directives of the 
United States Supreme Court. In the State's view, 
we have strayed from fidelity to constitutional 
principles by forsaking the linguistic latitude in the 
formulation of reasonable doubt instructions 
approved by the Supreme Court in favor of what the 
State characterizes as the mechanical and 
unworkable Robertson test. 
% 17 In this case, the court of appeals found that 
the trial court's reasonable doubt instructions failed 
the Robertson test and rejected them. Reyes, 2004 
UT App 8 at % 22, 84 P.3d 841. The State does 
not fault the court of appeals for this holding, noting 
that it took pains to distance itself from the outcome 
when it stated that, "[although [the Robertson] test 
may be constitutionally flawed, it is not within our 
power to overrule it." Id. 
\ 18 The Robertson test would not be " 
constitutionally flawed" were it merely to impose 
restrictions on permissible language that could be 
used to define "beyond a reasonable doubt," as 
Victor expressly recognized that countless 
constitutionally permissible "beyond a reasonable 
doubt" formulations could be crafted. Victor, 511 
U.S. at 5-6, 114 S.Ct. 1239. Victor also expressly 
approved the bare charge that the jury find guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt, unadorned by any 
supplemental definition at all. Id. Thus, the 
Robertson test could be constitutionally defective 
only if one or more of its three elements required 
Utah courts to incorporate language in their " 
beyond a reasonable doubt" instructions that were 
at odds with Victor's injunction that instructions not 
create a reasonable likelihood that " 'a reasonable 
juror could have interpreted the instruction to allow 
a finding of guilt based on a degree of proof below 
that required by the Due Process Clause.' " Id. at 6, 
114 S.Ct. 1239 (quoting Cage v. Louisiana, 498 
U.S. 39, 41, 111 S.Ct. 328, 112 L.Ed.2d 339 (1990) 
If 19 Mr. Reyes has challenged the reasonable 
doubt instruction in his case under the United States 
Constitution. He has not raised claims under the 
Utah Constitution. Thus, we, like the court of 
appeals, restrict our inquiry to the federal 
constitution. This limitation, however, is of little 
consequence here, inasmuch as none of our 
decisions that address the "beyond a reasonable 
doubt" standard have turned on an interpretation of 
the Utah Constitution. We readily concede that 
neither Robertson nor its predecessors draw upon, 
account for, or explain their relationship to the body 
of United States Supreme Court law on the subject 
of reasonable doubt. Implicit in our "beyond a 
reasonable doubt" cases, however, is the 
understanding that they are to be properly measured 
against the standards established by the Supreme 
Court. 
% 20 This is not to say that Victor, or any other 
Supreme Court case addressing reasonable doubt 
for that matter, contains clear directions to those 
charged with drafting "beyond a reasonable doubt" 
jury instructions. As the State acknowledges, the 
themes of Supreme Court reasonable doubt 
jurisprudence are broadly stated and include a 
reluctance to impose upon state courts a script for a 
national reasonable doubt instruction; an 
acknowledgment that the English language enjoys 
sufficient richness and variety in its storehouse of 
words to permit many formulations for proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt that correctly convey its 
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meaning; and a conviction that even words that in 
isolation might be constitutionally offensive may be 
rehabilitated when considered in their context. See 
id. at 5-6, 8-15, 114S.Ct. 1239. 
If 21 Given the structure and rationale of the 
Supreme Court's "beyond a reasonable doubt" 
jurisprudence, its constraints on this court are few. 
We are, of course, forbidden to approve reasonable 
doubt language that the Supreme Court has 
categorically rejected. Yet only once has the 
Supreme Court *311 held a reasonable doubt 
instruction to violate the Due Process Clause, and 
that case highlights the difficulties associated with 
keeping faith with the Court's guidelines. See Cage, 
498 U.S. at 40-41, 111 S.Ct. 328. In Cage, the 
Court held that the words "substantial" and "grave," 
when used to describe the degree of doubt 
necessary to require acquittal, unconstitutionally 
diminished the State's burden by overstating the 
quantum of uncertainty that "substantial" and "grave 
" created a reasonable doubt. Id. 
U 22 Following Cage, a court may have reasonably 
concluded it deployed either "substantial" or "grave 
" into a reasonable doubt instruction at its peril. 
This did not, however, prove to be the case. Victor 
redeemed "substantial." 511 U.S. at 19-21, 114 
S.Ct. 1239. Writing for six justices, Justice 
O'Connor conducted a detailed contextual parsing 
of Mr. Victor's jury instruction, which contained the 
term "substantial doubt," and concluded that when 
it was used to distinguish a form of doubt from 
mere "fanciful conjecture," id. at 20, 114 S.Ct. 
1239, it was sufficiently clear that the intended 
meaning of "substantial" was "not seeming or 
imaginary," and not the offending that "specified to 
a large degree" meaning found in Cage, id. at 9, 
114 S.Ct. 1239. As the fate of the word "substantial" 
illustrates, the work of gauging the constitutionality 
of a reasonable doubt jury instruction is highly 
context-dependent. For this reason, it is 
unproductive to cull from an instruction certain 
words and phrases and make claims either for or 
against the constitutionality of a jury instruction 
based on the Supreme Court's response to their use 
in a challenged instruction. 
^ 23 The Supreme Court's approval of providing 
no definition of "beyond a reasonable doubt" 
further complicates the task of identifying and 
applying federal constitutional standards to 
reasonable doubt instructions. That a jury may 
return a constitutionally-sanctioned verdict either 
unaided by any instruction defining reasonable 
doubt whatsoever, or one guided by instructions 
constructed in diverse ways, seems to suggest that 
the Supreme Court is engaging in a form of legal 
agnosticism-conceding that an ideal definition of 
reasonable doubt may exist, but despairing that any 
one will ever know what it looks like. 
B. Turning Away From "Obviate all Reasonable 
Doubt" 
[3] H 24 Against this backdrop, we turn to the 
instruction to which Mr. Reyes takes exception. 
The court of appeals felt constrained to reject the " 
beyond a reasonable doubt" instruction used in Mr. 
Reyes's trial because they failed to satisfy the 
Robertson requirements that the State must "obviate 
all reasonable doubt" and that it must avoid use of 
the phrase "reasonable doubt cannot merely be a 
possibility." Reyes, 2004 UT App 8 at ffif 19, 22, 
84 P.3d 841. The court of appeals applied two 
standards of review. Id. at <[ f 14, 16. First, it 
reviewed under a nondeferential correction of error 
standard the question of whether the reasonable 
doubt jury instruction properly applied the law set 
out in Robertson. Id. at % 14. It then assessed 
whether the failure to conform to the Robertson test 
was a "structural error" infringing on Mr. Reyes's 
guarantee of due process. Id. at ^ 16. 
1f 25 The court of appeals found merit in Mr. 
Reyes's claim that the trial court erred when it failed 
to expressly instruct that the State's proof must " 
obviate all reasonable doubt" as mandated by 
Robertson. Id. at % 19. The "obviate all 
reasonable doubt" test found life in Justice Stewart's 
dissent in State v. Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375, 1380-82 
(Utah 1989) (Stewart, J., dissenting). There, 
Justice Stewart took issue with an instruction that 
equated "beyond a reasonable doubt" with "an 
abiding conviction of the truth of the charge." Id. 
He reasoned that since the standard to be applied is 
"beyond a reasonable doubt," it followed that any 
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definition of the standard must reference the 
obstacle-reasonable doubt-to be overcome by the 
evidence, and must convey the principle that the 
State must surmount the obstacle of reasonable 
doubt to justify a conviction. Id. The "obviate all 
reasonable doubt" concept appears to derive from a 
fear that in ascertaining the conviction of the truth 
of a charge against a defendant, a juror might 
misapply the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard 
*312 unless she is required to search out, confront, 
and defeat reasonable doubt with evidence. 
If 26 Insightful and important as Justice Stewart's 
image of "beyond a reasonable doubt" may be, his 
suggestion that the jury be instructed to "obviate all 
reasonable doubt" is both linguistically opaque and 
conceptually suspect. Not every jury will confront 
evidence in its deliberations sufficient to create a 
reasonable doubt. The notion of "obviating" doubt 
is cumbersome at best where proof is scant or 
lacking in credibility. In these instances, a 
description of "beyond a reasonable doubt" that 
asks jurors to rate the magnitude of their conviction 
concerning the strength of the evidence imparts a 
more accurate and useful concept of "beyond a 
reasonable doubt" than does a construct that 
requires jurors to identify doubts and assess whether 
the evidence overcomes them. A universal 
application of the notion that the State must " 
obviate all reasonable doubt" can be achieved only 
by tying it to the concept of the presumption of 
innocence. If innocence is thought of as an array of 
inchoate reasonable doubts that the State must 
overcome to attain a conviction, it follows that the 
State must "obviate reasonable doubts" in every 
case. We do not, however, endorse this unwieldy 
view of the presumption of innocence. 
% 27 The process suggested by the "obviate all 
reasonable doubt" standard is also flawed because, 
contrary to its purpose, it tends to diminish the 
degree of proof necessary to convict and in that 
respect violates the Victor standard. The "obviation 
" of doubt contemplates a two-step undertaking: 
the identification of the doubt and a testing of the 
validity of the doubt against the evidence. This 
process suggests a back and forth disputation of a 
doubt's merits, all to the end of determining whether 
the evidence is sufficient to "obviate" the doubt. 
The "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard does 
not, however, condition a conclusion that a doubt is 
reasonable on an ability either to articulate the 
doubt or to state a reason for it. An unarticulated 
conviction that the State has failed to meet its 
burden of proof will serve as a legitimate basis to 
acquit. 
% 28 To the extent that the Robertson "obviate" 
test would permit the State to argue that it need only 
obviate doubts that are sufficiently defined, the test 
works to improperly diminish the State's burden. 
Writing in the Notre Dame Law Review, Professor 
Steve Sheppard criticized the expanding 
prominence of the requirement that doubts be 
articulated. Steve Sheppard, The Metamorphoses 
of Reasonable Doubt: How Changes in the Burden 
of Proof Have Weakened the Presumption of 
Innocence, 78 Notre Dame L.Rev. 1165 (2003). 
Professor Sheppard summarized the central vice of 
this trend this way: 
A troubling conclusion that arises from the 
difficulties of the requirement of articulability is 
that it hinders the juror who has a doubt based on 
the belief that the totality of the evidence is 
insufficient. Such a doubt lacks the specificity 
implied in an obligation to "give a reason," an 
obligation that appears focused on the details of the 
arguments. Yet this is precisely the circumstance 
in which the rhetoric of the law, particularly the 
presumption of innocence and the state burden of 
proof, require acquittal. 
Id. at 1213. 
% 29 Central to our reconsideration of the merits of 
the "obviate all reasonable doubt" element of 
Robertson is our belief that the exacting demands of 
the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard can be 
clearly and fairly communicated through an 
affirmative description of the degree of conviction 
that must be attained by a juror based on the 
evidence. We see little to be gained by including 
within a "beyond a reasonable doubt" instruction 
the potentially confusing concept that every 
defendant is entitled to a presumption of reasonable 
doubt, which the State's evidence must obviate. 
Tf 30 Because we conclude that "the obviate all 
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reasonable doubt" element of the Robertson test 
carries with it the substantial risk of causing a juror 
to find guilt based on a degree of proof below 
beyond a reasonable doubt, we expressly abandon it. 
C. Reasonable Doubt Cannot be a "Mere Possibility 
[4] [^ 31 We turn next to Mr. Reyes's claim that the 
"beyond a reasonable doubt" *313 instruction in his 
case offended the Robertson proscription against 
the phrase "reasonable doubt cannot merely be a 
possibility." This element of Robertson was also 
the product of Justice Stewart's dissent in Ireland. 
Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1232 (citing Ireland, 773 
P.2d at 1380-82) (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice 
Stewart's fundamental objection to excluding "mere 
possibility" from eligibility for consideration as 
reasonable doubt was that the term "possibility," 
standing alone, fails to disclose its location on the 
continuum marked at its extremes by impossibility 
and certainty. Ireland, 773 P.2d at 1381 (Stewart, 
J., dissenting). We stand by this observation. 
^ 32 Robertson correctly noted that neither Justice 
Stewart's dissent in Ireland nor the Robertson test it 
spawned outlawed all references to "possibilities" 
in defining reasonable doubt. Robertson, 932 P.2d 
at 1232-33. To the contrary, Robertson endorsed 
Justice Stewart's approval of language that " ' 
fanciful or wholly speculative possibility ought not 
to defeat proof beyond a reasonable doubt.' " Id. 
(quoting Ireland, 773 P.2d at 1382) (Stewart, J., 
dissenting). 
T[ 33 When complemented by appropriate 
qualifying and explanatory language, the use of the 
term "mere possibility" in the definition of doubt 
does not create a reasonable likelihood that the jury 
would apply an unconstitutionally diminished 
standard of proof. In fact, as the court of appeals 
observed, one of the instructions at issue in Victor 
survived a challenge to its definition of reasonable 
doubt as "not a mere possible doubt." Reyes, 2004 
UT App 8 at i| 18, 84 P.3d 841 (quoting Victor, 
511 U.S. at 7, 114 S.Ct. 1239). Here, the exclusion 
of doubt which is " 'merely possible5 " from 
consideration as a reasonable doubt is followed by 
the explanatory phrase " 'since everything in human 
affairs is open to some possible or imaginary doubt.' 
" This language effectively neutralizes the risk that 
the reference to a "mere possibility" will improperly 
lead a juror to apply a standard of proof lesser than 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
If 34 We conclude that the requirement that the 
jury be instructed that it must "obviate all 
reasonable doubt" before it may find guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt is flawed and must be abandoned. 
The instruction given to Mr. Reyes's jury 
appropriately addressed the concept of "possibility" 
in gauging the reasonableness of doubt. We 
therefore reverse the court of appeals on this issue 
and affirm Mr. Reyes's conviction. 
D. A "Clear, Straightforward and Accurate" 
Definition of Reasonable Doubt 
[5] If 35 Although we have allied ourselves with 
the Supreme Court in our skepticism of the value of 
"talismatic phraseology" to define the "beyond a 
reasonable doubt" standard, State v. Young, 853 
P.2d 327, 347 (Utah 1993), we are convinced that 
the time has come to provide express guidance to 
trial courts concerning the contents of a "beyond a 
reasonable doubt" instruction. We are moved to 
take this action for several reasons. First, there 
exists a substantial inventory of reasonable doubt 
formulations that have gained either express or tacit 
ratification by this court and other state and federal 
courts. There is an understandable tendency to 
insert within a "beyond a reasonable doubt" 
instruction multiple definitions in the hope that 
singularly or collectively they may bring to jurors 
clarity of understanding. Such a practice is just as 
likely to bring about the real but unintended result 
of making reasonable doubt less comprehensible. 
An instruction larded with multiple definitions of 
reasonable doubt may also convey the incorrect 
message that a doubt must survive review under 
each definition before it may qualify as a " 
reasonable doubt." 
% 36 We have earlier explained our dissatisfaction 
with the historical approaches to appellate review of 
"beyond a reasonable doubt." In general, the 
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experience of appellate review of "beyond a 
reasonable doubt" instructions has been one marked 
by the enterprise of winnowing out ill-conceived 
notions of reasonable doubt. Left to follow this 
historical practice, we are doubtful that a 
serviceable "reasonable doubt" instruction will ever 
emerge. 
K 37 We therefore exercise our supervisory 
authority to promulgate for use in the courts *314 of 
this state the instruction proposed by the Federal 
Judicial Center that reads: 
"The [State] has the burden of proving the 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Some 
of you may have served as jurors in civil cases, 
where you were told that it is only necessary to 
prove that a fact is more likely true than not true. 
In criminal cases, the [State's] proof must be more 
powerful than that. It must be beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that 
leaves you firmly convinced of the defendant's guilt. 
There are very few things in this world that we 
know with absolute certainty, and in criminal cases 
the law does not require proof that overcomes every 
possible doubt. If, based on your consideration of 
the evidence, you are firmly convinced that the 
defendant is guilty of the crime charged, you must 
find him guilty. If on the other hand, you think 
there is a real possibility that he is not guilty, you 
must give him the benefit of the doubt and find him 
not guilty." 
Victor, 511 U.S. at 27, 114 S.Ct 1239 (Ginsburg, 
J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment) (quoting Federal Judicial Center, Pattern 
Criminal Jury Instructions 17-18 (instruction 21) ). 
1f 38 The use of this instruction was advocated by 
Justice Ginsburg in her concurring opinion in 
Victor. Id. She described it as "clear, 
straightforward, and accurate." Id. at 26, 114 S.Ct. 
1239. We agree. Moreover, in the span of time 
since its promulgation in 1987, the instruction has 
enjoyed a positive reception.1^2 We believe that 
the consistent application of this instruction 
resolves any uncertainty in the phrase "beyond a 
reasonable doubt" and will benefit jurors while 
setting forth a balanced charge to the State and 
defendants. Yet, we note that history has proven 
that defining "beyond a reasonable doubt" is a 
process of evolution and adaptation, and in the 
future new definitions may emerge. Moreover, we 
recognize that instructions that once enjoyed 
widespread acceptance became anachronistic and 
inaccurate due to shifting definitions of terms.™3 
In recognition of this possibility, we authorize use 
of Federal Judiciary Center Instruction 21 in Utah 
courts as a "safe harbor" instruction, but we stop 
short of disqualifying as constitutionally defective 
other reasonable doubt instructions that conform to 
the principles announced in this opinion. 
FN2. See, eg., State v. Prasertphong, 206 
Ariz. 70, 75 P.3d 675, 696 (2003); 
Arizona v. Portillo, 182 Ariz. 592, 898 
P.2d 970, 974 (1995) (adopting and 
requiring use of the Federal Judicial 
Center's Jury Instruction 21 as advocated 
by Justice Ginsburg because "the Federal 
Judicial Center's proposed definition most 
fairly and accurately conveys the meaning 
of reasonable doubt"); Mills v. State, 732 
A.2d 845, 852 (Del. 1999) (upholding the 
jury instruction given, which was "almost 
identical to the model explanation 
proposed by the Federal Judicial Center"); 
Smith v. United States, 709 A.2d 78, 81 
(D.C.1998) (observing that "the approval 
of a single instruction for use in all 
criminal trials will not intrude unduly into 
the area of trial court discretion, for the 
standard of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt is applicable to every criminal trial 
and is not subject to change because of the 
evidence or legal theories presented.") 
Winegeart v. State, 665 N.E.2d 893, 902 
(Ind.1996) (recommended the Federal Jury 
Instruction 21 stating that "[a] substantial 
improvement in effective communication 
may be achieved by utilization of the 
Federal Judicial Center's proposed 
instruction"). 
FN3. See, eg, Victor, 511 U.S. at 8, 114 
S Ct. 1239. There the Court reviewed the 
reasonable doubt instruction used in Mr. 
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Sandoval's case. The instruction was set 
forth in 1850 in Commonwealth v. Webster, 
59 Mass. 295, 320 (1850), and for almost 
one hundred years was heralded as " 
probably the most satisfactory definition 
ever given to the words 'reasonable doubt' 
in any case known to criminal 
jurisprudence." People v. Strong, 30 Cal. 
151, 155 (1866). The instruction utilized 
the phrase "moral certainty," which caused 
the Victor Court some concern because, as 
Justice O'Connor wrote, the phrase in Mr. 
Sandoval's case did not likely have the 
same textual meaning as when it was 
written in 1850. Victor, 511 U.S. at 13, 
114 S.Ct. 1239. She observed that " 
[w]ords and phrases can change meaning 
over time: A passage generally understood 
in 1850 may be incomprehensible or 
confusing to a modern juror." Id. The 
Court responded that it did not condone 
the phrase "moral certainty," but felt that 
overall it did not render the reasonable 
doubt instruction infirm. Id. at 16-17, 114 
S.Ct. 1239. 
II. MR. REYES'S APPEAL ON FAILURE TO 
REINSTRUCT THE JURY 
[6] H 39 We granted Mr. Reyes's cross-petition for 
certiorari to review the court of *315 appeals's 
determination that although the trial court erred 
when it failed to repeat its recitation of jury 
instructions at the close of the evidence, the error 
was harmless. He insists that, as an error of 
constitutional dimension, the failure to reinstruct the 
jury could not be harmless. We affirm the result 
reached by the court of appeals that Mr. Reyes was 
not entitled to a new trial based on the timing of the 
trial court's recitation of jury instructions, but do so 
on the grounds that the trial court did not commit 
error. 
If 40 The court of appeals applied a plain meaning 
analysis to Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 
17(g)(6). State v. Reyes, 2004 UT App 8, ] 24, 84 
P.3d 841. Rule 17(g)(6) instructs that "[w]hen the 
evidence is concluded and at any other appropriate 
time, the court shall instruct the jury." Utah 
R.Crim. P. 17(g)(6). The court of appeals 
concluded that the text of the rule required that the 
trial court repeat the recitation of preliminary jury 
instructions at the close of the evidence. Reyes, 
2004 UT App 8 at ffl[ 23-24, 84 P.3d 841. It 
therefore held that the trial court erred in refusing 
Mr. Reyes's request for a second recitation of the 
instructions at the conclusion of evidence. Id. at ^ 
26. Having determined that the trial court violated 
rule 17(g)(6), the court of appeals reasoned that it 
need not take up Mr. Reyes's claim that the failure 
to comply with rule 17(g)(6)'s timing requirements 
for reciting instructions denied him due process. Id. 
at U 26 n. 7. It then analyzed the degree of 
prejudice the error caused Mr. Reyes. Id. at % 27. 
Using the standard set out in rule 30 of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, as interpreted by State 
v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 920 (Utah 1987), the court 
of appeals found the error harmless because the 
likelihood of a different outcome was not 
sufficiently high to undermine confidence in the 
verdict. Id. at Iffi 27-28. 
1} 41 Mr. Reyes does not challenge the court of 
appeals's conclusion that the trial court's error did 
not undermine confidence in the guilty verdict 
rendered against him. Rather, he contends that the 
trial court's error was constitutional in its nature and 
structural in its magnitude and, thus, its gravity was 
more substantial than the court of appeals 
acknowledged. For this reason, Mr. Reyes argued 
that the harmless error test employed by the court of 
appeals was not sufficiently rigorous. Where a 
defendant's constitutional rights have been 
infringed, prejudice should be presumed or, at a 
minimum, the burden should be placed on the State 
to prove the absence of prejudice beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Thus, Mr. Reyes's challenge to 
the propriety of the court of appeals's standard for 
evaluating harmlessness is inextricably connected to 
the nature of the right associated with the timing of 
the recitation of jury instructions.1^4 
FN4. We note that neither the State nor 
Mr. Reyes sought certiorari to challenge 
the court of appeals's determination that 
the trial court erred when it failed to repeat 
its recitation of the preliminary instructions 
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at the close of the evidence. However, 
our consideration of this issue is made 
permissible, even inevitable, by the 
formulation of Mr. Reyes's cross-petition 
for certiorari review. By urging us to 
consider whether the trial court's jury 
instruction method resulted in a violation 
of his constitutional rights, Mr. Reyes has 
asked us to examine the magnitude of the 
trial court's error. This inquiry logically 
and necessarily includes the possibility that 
we might conclude that no error occurred. 
% 42 Based on our assessment of the totality of the 
circumstances surrounding the trial court's 
presentation of instructions to the jury, we hold that 
the timing of the trial court's recitation of jury 
instructions complied with rule 17(g)(6). Since 
there was no error, we need not review the court of 
appeals's assessment of the harmfulness of the error. 
U 43 Rule 17(g)(6) of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure provides that "[w]hen the evidence is c 
oncluded and at any other appropriate time, the 
court shall instruct the jury." Utah R.Crim. P. 
17(g)(6). Contrary to the court of appeals's 
determination that this provision is unambiguous, 
we can extract several plausible interpretations of 
its text. The interpretative divide occurs at the 
term "instruct." One reasonable interpretation of 
rule 17(g)(6) is the one embraced by the court of 
appeals. Under its rendition of the text, the rule 
mandates a complete rereading of all instructions 
when the evidence is concluded. *316 This 
interpretation can be traced to the assumption that 
the word "instruct," although a verb, also connotes 
a noun defined as the entire body of jury 
instructions. The court of appeals finds comfort in 
this reading because it inoculate the rule against the 
mischief of permitting a trial court to comply with 
its terms by merely reading one instruction at the 
close of the evidence. Reyes, 2004 UT App 8 at ^ 
24,84P.3d841. 
f 44 The interpretation chosen by the court of 
appeals to sidestep one absurd result exposes the 
rule to an equally incongruous one. A complete 
repetition of instructions would force a judge to 
read and the jury to endure instructions, such as 
those describing "order of presentation" or " 
note-taking", that have no relevance at the close of 
the trial and have no bearing on law applicable to 
the case or to the jury's responsibilities upon retiring 
to deliberate. A categorical requirement that all 
instructions be repeated at the close of evidence 
would strip the trial judge of any discretion in 
selecting timely and helpful directions to the jury 
and would likely tend to distract the jury and dilute 
its attention to critical substantive and procedural 
guidance present in other instructions. In implicit 
recognition of the difficulties with a categorical and 
nondiscretionary reading of rule 17(g)(6), the court 
of appeals first embraced, but then receded from the 
requirement that a trial court reread at the close of 
the evidence all of the instructions it had previously 
delivered. While at first indicating that a trial court 
would violate rule 17(g)(6) "by giving the jury 
some of its instructions before opening statements 
(an "appropriate time") and the rest of its 
instructions before closing arguments," the court 
modified its view by the time it announced its 
holding. Id. There, it insisted only that the trial 
court repeat only those instructions that relate to the 
defendant's fundamental rights. Id. It is not clear to 
us how this retreat from an "all or nothing" 
interpretation of rule 17(g)(6) can be squared with a 
plain meaning interpretation of the rule that finds its 
text unambiguous. 
f 45 A second plausible interpretation of rule 
17(g)(6) can be derived by restricting the meaning 
of "instruct" to its verb form, describing the act of 
reciting an instruction. This interpretation would 
require trial judges to provide some instruction 
when the evidence is concluded, but would not offer 
guidance on the nature and extent of the instructions 
to be given at that stage of the trial. In our view, an 
interpretation of rule 17(g)(6) that leaves undefined 
the scope of instructions that the court must recite at 
the close of the evidence is preferable to a rendering 
of the rule that, in its attempt to achieve certainty 
and uniformity in the presentation of instructions, 
will accomplish the opposite. Trial judges faced 
with the obligation to repeat all instructions 
previously recited at the conclusion of the evidence 
would have good reason to opt to avoid giving 
preliminary instructions at all rather than risk the 
confusion and distraction of repeating instructions 
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ill-suited for that occasion. We have scant 
reservation about resolving the ambiguity created 
by construing "instruct" as a verb by ceding to trial 
judges the discretion to determine the appropriate 
instructions to deliver to the jury at the close of the 
evidence. 
^[46 Although we agree generally with the court of 
appeals's concern that the jury be instructed "on 
matters of law vital to the rights of a defendant" at 
the close of the evidence, we do not read rule 
17(g)(6) to demand the repetition of even "vital 
rights" instructions at the close of the evidence in 
all instances. In a trial of short duration or where 
the trial judge has had occasion to provide 
instruction concerning one or more "vital rights" 
shortly before the close of the evidence, the jury's 
comprehension of those "vital rights" may be 
enhanced by the judicious exercise of the judge's 
discretion in fashioning close of evidence 
instructions which take a form other than a 
rereading of instructions previously delivered. 
% 47 The paramount goal that guides the timing of 
the recitation of an instruction is jury 
comprehension. The importance of jury 
comprehension is evident from the text of rule 19 of 
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Utah 
R.Crim. P. 19. In addressing the topic of jury 
instructions, rule 19 was substantially rewritten in 
2001 as part of a comprehensive jury reform 
initiative undertaken*317 by this court and the 
Utah Judicial Council. The new rule 19 instructs: 
(a) After the jury is sworn and before opening 
statements, the court may instruct the jury 
concerning the jurors' duties and conduct, the order 
of proceedings, the elements and burden of proof 
for the alleged crime, and the definition of terms. 
The court may instruct the jury concerning any 
matter stipulated to by the parties and agreed to by 
the court and any matter the court in its discretion 
believes will assist the jurors in comprehending the 
case. Preliminary instructions shall be in writing 
and a copy provided to each juror. At the final 
pretrial conference or at such other time as the court 
directs, a party may file a written request that the 
court instruct the jury on the law as set forth in the 
request. The court shall inform the parties of its 
action upon a requested instruction prior to 
instructing the jury, and it shall furnish the parties 
with a copy of its proposed instructions, unless the 
parties waive this requirement, 
(b) During the course of the trial, the court may 
instruct the jury on the law if the instruction will 
assist the jurors in comprehending the case. Prior 
to giving the written instruction, the court shall 
advise the parties of its intent to do so and of the 
content of the instruction. A party may request an 
interim written instruction. 
Id at 19(a)-(b) (2003). 
K 48 The common objective of these provisions is 
jury comprehension. The means chosen to pursue 
the end of better jury comprehension is a grant of 
expanded flexibility in the content of jury 
instructions and the timing of their recitation to the 
jury. It is impossible for us to harmonize the 
pragmatic tone of rule 19 with a hidebound 
interpretation of rule 17, and we decline to do so. 
^ 49 The trial judge's decision to forego the 
repetition of jury instruction in this case was well 
within the bounds of discretion afforded by rule 17 
and rule 19. As noted by the court of appeals, less 
than twenty-four hours separated the trial court's 
reading of the preliminary instructions from the 
conclusion of the evidence. In addition, the jury 
was provided with a written copy of every 
instruction. Accordingly, we affirm the court of 
appeals's result on the issue of the trial court's 
timing of its recitation of jury instructions, but on 
different grounds. 
CONCLUSION 
% 50 For the reasons detailed herein, we reverse 
the court of appeals and reinstate Mr. Reyes's 
conviction. We abandon Robertson's insistence 
that the jury be instructed that to return a guilty-
verdict it must "obviate all reasonable doubts." 
We authorize for use in our court the Federal 
Judicial Center's Pattern Criminal Jury Instruction 
21. We also affirm on alternate grounds the court 
of appeals's refusal to grant Mr. Reyes relief on his 
challenge to the timing of the jury instructions. 
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U 51 Chief Justice DURHAM, Associate Chief 
Justice WILKINS, Justice DURRANT, and Justice 
PARRISH concur in Justice NEHRING's opinion. 
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Addendum C {Halls) 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. » 
A defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt. This presumption follows the defendant 
throughout the trial. If a defendant's guilt is not shown beyond 
a reasonable doubt, the defendant should be acquitted. 
The state must eliminate ajfreasonable doubt. Proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt is not proof to an absolute certainty. Reasonable 
doubt is a doubt based on reason, which is reasonable in view of 
all the evidence. Reasonable doubt is not a doubt based on fancy, 
imagination, or wholly speculative possibility. Proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt is enough proof to satisfy the mind, or convince 
the understanding of those bound to act conscientiously, and enough 
to eliminate reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is a doubt that 
reasonable people would entertain based upon the evidence in the 
case. 
INSTRUCTION NO. J 
In order to obtain a conviction, the state must prove each 
element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Those elements 
are as follows: 
COUNT I: POSSESSION OF METHAMPHETAMINE 
1. That on or about March 1, 2004, 
2. Defendant possessed methamphetamine, 
3. Knowing what it was and intending to use it. 
COUNT II: POSSESSION OF IMITATION CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE 
1. That on or about March 1, 2004, 
2. Defendant possessed an imitation controlled 
substance, 
3. With intent to distribute it. 
COUNT III: POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA 
1. That on or about March 1, 2004, 
2. Defendant possessed drug paraphernalia, 
3. With intent to use it. 
If you believe that the state has proved each of these 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find defendant 
guilty. If the state has failed to prove any one of those elements 
beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find defendant not guilty. 
Addendum D {Kinne) 
-7 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
A defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt. This presumption follows the defendant 
throughout the trial. If a defendant's guilt is not shown beyond 
a reasonable doubt, the defendant should be acquitted. 
The state must eliminate aj I reasonable doubt. Proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt is not proof to an absolute certainty. Reasonable 
doubt is a doubt based on reason, which is reasonable in view of 
all the evidence. Reasonable doubt is not a doubt based on fancy, 
imagination, or wholly speculative possibility. Proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt is enough proof to satisfy the mind, or convince 
the understanding of those bound to act conscientiously, and enough 
to eliminate reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is a doubt that 
reasonable people would entertain based upon the evidence in the 
case. 
INSTRUCTION NO, 1 
In order to obtain a conviction, the state must prove each 
element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Those elements 
are as follows: 
COUNT I 
COUNT II: 
COUNT III: 
COUNT IV: 
BURGLARY OF A DWELLING 
1. That on or about December 9, 2 003, 
2. Defendant entered or remained in a dwelling of 
another, 
3. Without permission, 
4. With intent to commit a theft. 
THEFT OF A FIREARM 
1. That on or about December 9, 2 003, 
2. Defendant exercised unauthorized control, 
3. Of a firearm belonging to another, 
4. With a purpose to deprive the owner thereof. 
RECEIVING OR TRANSFERRING STOLEN MOTOR VEHICLE 
1. That on or about January 4, 2 0 04, 
2. Defendant possessed a motor vehicle, 
3 . That he knew or had reason to believe had been 
stolen. 
POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA 
1. That on or about January 4, 20 04, 
2. Defendant possessed drug paraphernalia, 
3. With intent to use it. 
If you believe that the state has proved each of these 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find defendant 
guilty. If the state has failed to prove any one of those elements 
beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find defendant not guilty. 
Addendum E (Austin) 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
A defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt. This presumption follows the defendant 
throughout the trial. If a defendant's guilt is not proven beyond 
a reasonable doubt, the defendant should be acquitted. 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not proof to an absolute 
certainty. It is the burden of the State to eliminate all 
reasonable doubt. Reasonable doubt is a doubt based on reason, 
which is reasonable in view of all the evidence. Reasonable doubt 
is not a doubt based on fancy, imagination, or wholly speculative 
possibility. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is enough proof to 
satisfy the mind, or convince the understanding of those bound to 
act conscientiously, and enough to eliminate reasonable doubt. A 
reasonable doubt is a doubt that reasonable people would entertain 
based upon the evidence in the case. 
INSTRUCTION NO . 3 
In order to obtain a conviction, the state must prove each 
element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Those elements 
are as follows: 
COUNT I: MURDER 
1. That on or about May 9, 2 004 
2. Defendant either, 
a. Intentionally or knowingly caused the death of 
another, or 
b. i. Intending to cause serious bodily injury 
to another, 
ii. Committed an act clearly dangerous to 
human life, 
iii. That caused the death of another, or 
c. i. Acting under circumstances evidencing a 
depraved indifference to human life, 
ii. Engaged in conduct which created a grave 
risk of death of another, and 
iii. Thereby caused the death of another 
COUNT II: AGGRAVATED ROBBERY 
1. That on or about May 9, 2 004 
2. Intentionally or knowingly 
3. Used force or fear of immediate force against 
another in the course of committing a theft, and 
4. Either a) used or threatened to use a dangerous 
weapon, or (b) took an operable motor vehicle 
COUNT III: INTERFERENCE WITH ARRESTING OFFICER 
1. That on or about May 9, 2 004, 
2. Knowing that a peace officer was seeking to arrest 
or detain him, 
3. Defendant interfered with the arrest or detention 
by refusing to perform a lawful order made by a 
peace officer involved in the arrest or detention, 
If you believe that the state has proved each of these 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find defendant 
guilty. If the state has failed to prove any one of those elements 
beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find defendant not guilty. 
